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OFFICIOUS INTERMEDDLING,
INTERLOPING CHAUVINISM,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AND LEFLAR:
WISCONSIN'S CHOICE OF LAW MELTING
POT
SHIRLEY A. WIEGAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the 1960s, a court's choice of law in the United States was
fairly predictable. As with personal jurisdiction until the mid-twentieth
century,1 the physical boundaries of states in which key events took
place determined choice of law outcomes. Courts applied the law of the
place where the particular right "vested," and several principles deter-
mined where vesting occurred and hence which state's law applied in a
dispute involving more than one state. Under the principle of lex loci
delicti in tort cases, the right vested at the place of injury, and courts
therefore applied the law of that place. For contract cases, the princi-
ple of lex loci contractus directed courts to apply the law of the place
where the contract was made. Cases involving property disputes were
governed by lex situs, the law of the place where the property was situ-
ated . The 1934 Restatement of Conflict of Laws reflected these com-
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[E]very State possesses exclu-
sive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory... [N]o State
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.")
with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (both of which permitted states to reach beyond their
boundaries and exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents).
2. See, e.g., Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
3. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878). This determination was not always
easy. According to contract principles, the place of the contract's formation often depended
upon whether the contract was unilateral or bilateral and upon whether or not a contract was
formed when acceptance was sent or received.
4. This determination could easily be made for real property, but not for movable prop-
erty. See, e.g., In re Barrie's Estate, 35 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1949) (real property); Cammell v.
Sewell, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (Ex. Ch. 1860) (movable property).
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mon law principles.5
But as the United States population became more mobile and cor-
porations increasingly conducted interstate business, state borders lost
some of their territorial significance. Improvements in transportation
and communication made travel faster, cheaper, and less burdensome.
States began to reach beyond their own borders, often in an attempt to
expand their power over property and persons situated in other states.
An increase in interstate commerce necessitated an expansion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresidents. Personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence began to focus on the "minimum contacts" a defendant had with
a state, rather than on the defendant's physical "presence" within a
state. "Fair play and substantial justice" became important factors in
the personal jurisdiction determination.'
Similarly, the physical events which took place within state borders
no longer automatically and unquestionably marked that state's law as
the applicable law. Traditional territorial choice of law principles often
led to questionable results which seemed unfair. For example, a train
might cross several states, with tortious conduct committed in each, yet
if the injury resulting from the tortious conduct finally occurred just af-
ter the train crossed into State X, State X's law would apply as the law
of the place of injury (lex loci delicti).7
Before courts ultimately rejected traditional choice of law analysis,
they developed a variety of methods to avoid absurd results. These in-
cluded characterization of a set of facts in such a way as to permit the
court to apply the preferred state law. For example, if a person exe-
cuted a promissory note and mortgage of real property to secure her
debt and the creditor sought to collect, a court might determine that the
case sounded in contract because of the promissory note and therefore
would apply lex loci contractus-the law of the place of contracting.
But the court might instead determine that the mortgage of real prop-
erty mandates lex situs-the law of the property's location.' In a study
of eight Arkansas cases-all decided within a period of ten years, all re-
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 214-254,332,358,384 (1934).
6. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316,320.
7. See, e.g., Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. at 803 (applying Missis-
sippi law to a case between an Alabama employee and his Alabama corporate employer (an
employment relationship formed in Alabama) for injuries resulting from negligence in Ala-
bama. The employee was injured when a previously defective train link finally broke and
caused the injury in Mississippi).
8. Compare Swank v. Hufnagle, 12 N.E. 303 (Ind. 1887) (lex situs) with Burr v. Beckler,
106 N.E. 206 (Ill. 1914) (lex loci contractus).
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questing damages for mental anguish caused by failure to deliver a tele-
gram-one scholar noted that Arkansas courts inevitably applied Ar-
kansas law regardless of where the injury occurred. If the telegram was
to be sent from Arkansas, the case was characterized as a contract case
and Arkansas law applied as the place of the contract. If the telegram
was to be sent to Arkansas, the case was characterized as a tort case and
Arkansas law applied as the place of injury.9
In other instances, courts avoided the harsh rigidity of traditional
analysis by reliance on the distinction between procedure and sub-
stance. Traditionally, forum law governed procedural issues on the the-
ory that procedural rules by definition do not affect outcomes. Thus, a
court could freely apply its own procedural rules for convenience and
efficiency, and choice of law analysis was required only for substantive
issues. The 1934 Restatement specifically provided: "All matters of
procedure are governed by the law of the forum."'" At the same time,
"[t]he court at the forum determines according to its own Conflict of
Laws rule whether a given question is one of substance or procedure."
In Grant v. McAuliff the California court applied California law to
determine whether a tort action survives the California tortfeasor's
death. Rather than apply the law of the place of injury-Arizona-the
court determined that survival of causes of action "is not an essential
part of the cause of action itself but relates to the procedures available
for the enforcement of the legal claim for damages. Basically the ques-
tion is one of the administration of decedents' estate, which is a purely
local proceeding."' 3
In another equally famous case, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,'4
a New York court rejected Massachusetts's cap for wrongful death ac-
tions in a case arising from an airplane crash in Massachusetts. Instead,
the court found that a damages limitation "'pertains to the remedy,
9. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAws 95 (1962) (citing Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Chilton, 140 S.W. 26 (Ark. 1911)); Arkansas & L.R. Co. v. Stroude, 100
S.W. 760 (Ark. 1907); Gentle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 S.W. 742 (Ark. 1907); Arkansas
& La. P. Co. v. Lee, 96 S.W. 148 (Ark. 1906); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, 92 S.W. 528
(Ark. 1906)(telegrams sent to Arkansas: tort); and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Flannagan,
167 S.W. 701 (Ark. 1914); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Griffin, 122 S.W. 489 (Ark. 1909);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Woodard, 105 S.W. 579 (Ark. 1907) (telegrams sent from Arkan-
sas: contract).
10. RESTATEMENTOFCONFLICrOFLAWS § 585 (1934).
11. Id. § 584.
12. 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
13. Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
14. 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
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rather than the right,"' that is, procedure rather than substance, and the
court could therefore apply its own law.5
Public policy served as yet another escape mechanism.' 6 If tradi-
tional choice of law analysis directed a court to apply foreign law that
"would violate [the forum's] fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal,"'17 the court could reject the foreign law outright as viola-
tive of the forum's public policy. It might then dismiss the case alto-
gether"8 or simply apply its own law.19
By the 1950s, a number of scholars had suggested that traditional
choice of law analysis ought to be retired, rather than adhere to an out-
dated methodology that invited manipulation. By 1983 only twenty-
nine states continued to follow traditional analysis 3 By the end of
1996, only fifteen states used a substantial part of the First Restate-
ment.' Of these fifteen states, "12 jurisdictions continue to adhere to
the lex loci delicti rule, and 10 jurisdictions continue to adhere to the lex
loci contractus rule."' Even within this listing, states carve out excep-
tions, rejecting the First Restatement methodology for certain types of
cases, such as U.C.C., insurance, and workers' compensation.2
15. Id. at 528 (quoting Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. R. Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 16, 26 N.E.
1050, 1051 (1891). The court also based its decision upon the public policy exception, dis-
cussed below.
16. The public policy exception, unlike the characterization and substance-procedure
mechanisms, is a true "escape device" designed to permit courts to overtly reject an other-
wise obvious result.
17. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198,202 (N.Y. 1918).
18. The court in Loucks, while rejecting the public policy exception in that case, stated
that courts would be "free to refuse to enforce a foreign right," to "close their doors," if it
found that enforcement of the right violated the forum's public policy. Id. at 201.
19. See, e.g., Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986) (applying traditional
analysis, the court rejected the guest statute of the place of injury, because it violated West
Virginia's public policy. The court instead applied its own law and permitted the case to con-
tinue).
20. William M. Richman & David Riley, The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws on
the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practice on Traditional Courts,
paper presented at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Washington,
D.C. (Jan. 6, 1997), at 10.
21. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth An-
nual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447, 459-60 (1997). The states are: Alabama, Florida
(contracts only), Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Montana (torts only), New Mexico, North
Carolina (torts only), Rhode Island (contracts only), South Carolina, Tennessee (contracts
only), Vermont (torts only), Virginia, West Virginia (torts only), and Wyoming (torts only).
22. ld. at 458.
23. Richman & Riley, supra note 20, at 11.
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The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws? is clearly the major
replacement of traditional analysis. After a seventeen year effort, the
American Law Institute approved the Restatement (Second) in 1969.'
It is now employed by approximately half the states."
Described by its Reporter as "eclectic and territorial," 2' the Second
Restatement incorporates several different approaches to conflicts
analysis. Section 6 lists "factors relevant" to the choice of law in all sub-
stantive areas; they include: "the needs of the interstate and interna-
tional systems;" "the relevant policies of the forum" and "of other in-
terested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue;" "the protection of justified ex-
pectations;" "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;"
"certainty, predictability and uniformity of result;" and "ease in the de-
termination and application of the law to be applied."2 Other Re-
statement sections target specific areas of law and provide both a pre-
sumptive rule plus a list of relevant "contacts" that are to be considered.
For example, the law applicable to a tort issue is presumed to be the law
of the place of injury, "unless, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6. "29 To determine which state has the most significant rela-
tionship to the occurrence and the parties, one is to consider certain
"contacts."' "[C]ontacts to be taken into account in applying the prin-
ciples of § 6" include the place of injury, place of injury-causing con-
duct, the parties' "domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business," and "the place where the relationship, if any, be-
24. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971).
25. Willis Reese, Choice of Law and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679, 680 (1963); W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality
and a Proposal for Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 23,38 (1985).
26. Twenty states follow Restatement (Second) for Tort Conflicts: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
Another three-Indiana, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico-use the similar "significant con-
tacts" test. Twenty-five states follow Restatement (Second) for contract conflicts: Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma
(doubtful), South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Another five use the "significant contacts" test: Arkansas, Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina,
Puerto Rico. See Symeon C. Symeonides, supra note 21, at 459-60.
27. Willis M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34 MERCER
L. REV. 501,507 (1983).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
29. Id. § 146 (1971).
30. Id § 145 (1971).
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tween the parties is centered."'"
The Second Restatement provides similar presumptive rules and
key contacts for a host of legal issues, including contract,' defamation33
wrongful death,' charitable immunity," the right to contribution,36 and
many others.
Although the First and Second Restatements continue to dominate
the fifty states' choice-of-law methodologies, other approaches have not
gone unnoticed. One of the early critics of traditional analysis, law pro-
fessor Brainerd Currie, introduced the appealing notion of governmen-
tal interest analysis. In a significant 1958 law journal article,' he dem-
onstrated that in the context of married women's contracts, traditional
analysis not only failed to achieve its greatest value, uniformity, but also
frequently led to indefensible results.38 He proposed policy-based gov-
ernmental interest analysis as a means of producing more satisfactory
choice of law results.
Currie's analysis begins with identifying the policy or purpose be-
hind each of the arguably applicable state laws. For example, assume
that States A, B, and C all have some connection with the cause of ac-
tion and that the laws of each state differ materially. Currie proposes
that the court examine the policy or purpose behind each law. If the
purpose of State A's law would be advanced by the application of that
law, State A has an interest in having its law apply. If State A is the
only state with an interest, the conflict is false and the court will apply
the law of State A.39 But if more than one state has an interest that
would be advanced by the application of its law, the "sensible and
clearly constitutional thing for any court to do... is to apply its own
law."' If no state has such an interest, Currie suggested that a state also
31. Id.
32. Id. § 188. The Restatement (Second) also provides rules for particular kinds of con-
tracts. See, e.g., § 189 (contracts for the transfer of interests in land), § 192 (life insurance
contracts), § 193 (contracts of fire, surety or casualty insurance).
33. Id. § 149.
34. Id. § 175.
35. Id. § 168.
36. Id. § 173.
37. Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Law Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). He published another influential article the following year,
based on a paper presented at the 1958 Association of American Law Schools annual confer-
ence. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE LJ. 171.
38. Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 37, at 246-47.
39. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969).
40. Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 37, at 261.
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apply its own law simply because this is "rational and convenient.""
Today, Currie's analysis has found wide acceptance among conflicts
scholars, but it is the dominant conflicts methodology of only a few
courts.42
Other scholarly voices offered alternatives to the Restatement
methodologies. Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig proposed forum law as
the "starting point with some or most of our traditional conflicts rules
functioning as exceptions." 43 He also identified and weighed a variety of
considerations which influence a court's choice of law." Professor
David Cavers proposed that true conflicts be resolved by seven
"principles of preference." 4 Professor Russell Weintraub, like Brainerd
Currie, favored a "policy-oriented approach." He rejected forum law
preference, contact counting and the most significant relationship ap-
proach, and the "better rule" theory, proposed by, among others, Rob-
ert Leflar.47
But it is Professor Leflar's methodology that completes the choice-
of-law picture in the United States today. In addition to those states
that follow the first Restatement, Restatement (Second), Currie's gov-
ernmental interest analysis, lex fori (law of the forum),' or a mixed
modern methodology, 49 five states, including Wisconsin, have adopted
Leflar's choice-of-law methodology for tort, and two states, including
(arguably)' Wisconsin, have adopted it for contract.
41. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECrED ESSAYS ONTHE CONFLICr OF LAWS 153-56 (1963).
42. See Symeonides, supra note 21, at 459-60. The three are California, District of Co-
lumbia, and New Jersey.
43. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of
Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595, 595 (1960).
44. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 267,269 (1966) (citing Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws (1962)).
45. See DAVID CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 114-203 (1965).
46. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems, 21 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 573,576 (1960).
47. See iL at 580, 585 - 86.
48. Three states, Kentucky, Michigan, and Nevada, follow lexfori for tort conflicts. See
Symeonides, supra note 21, at 459. In addition, Nevada adopted a modified lex fori method-
ology in Motenko v. MGM Dist., 921 P.2d 933 (Nev. 1996).
49. Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania follow a
mixed approach for both tort and contract conflicts; and California, District of Columbia,
New Jersey, and North Dakota follow a mixed approach for contract conflicts. See Symeon-
ides, supra note 21, at 459-60.
50. The five states that follow Leflar for tort conflicts are Arkansas, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Minnesota and Wisconsin follow it for contract
conflicts. See Symeonides, supra note 21, at 459-60. As illustrated in this article, Professor
Symeonides's conclusion that Wisconsin follows Leflar's theory in contract cases is not accu-
1998]
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II. LEFLAR'S CHOICE-INFLUENCING CONSIDERATIONS
Professor Robert A. Leflar first discussed his approach in two influ-
ential articles published in 1966."' Building on the work of others who
had focused on the "true reasons that underlie choice-of-law adjudica-
tion,,12 Leflar identified "major considerations that should influence
choice of law," observing that they "have always been present and op-
erative in the cases," although "[t]hey have not always been identified
clearly, nor has the weight given to one or another among them always
been logical or sensible."53 In identifying these considerations, Leflar
noted that they come into play only when the facts of a case present a
"true," rather than a "false" conflict." He also cautioned against forum
law preference: "[I]t is important that the controlling power of forum
law be emphasized, and that this emphasis be appropriately confined."55
Leflar then provides a list of those five "considerations that have,
expressly or impliedly, always underlain common-law choice-of-law de-
cisions":"
A. Predictability of results;
B. Maintenance of interstate and international order;
C. Simplification of the judicial task;
D. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
E. Application of the better rule of law. 7
Leflar notes that the list does not prioritize; rather the "relative im-
portance" of each consideration "varies according to the area of the law
involved, and all should be considered regardless of area."58 He then of-
fers explanations for each of the five considerations.
rate.
51. See Leflar, supra note 44; Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
52. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. id. at 1585. Leflar cites earlier works by Professors Brainerd Currie, Elliott Cheatham
and Willis Reese, Hessel Yntema, Albert Ehrenzweig, and David F. Cavers. See id.
53. Leflar, supra note 44, at 267.
54. Id. at 270 n.19. "This does not refer to the 'false conflicts' cases, as to which Cur-
rie. .. performed the tremendous service of pointing out that there are no real choice-of-law
problems in them .... Though there is no agreement on exactly how far the 'false conflicts'
category is to be extended, it is intended that the present discussion relate to 'true conflicts'
cases only, whatever these may be" (citation omitted). See infra text accompanying notes 71-
72.
55. Leflar, supra note 44, at 270.
56. Id. at 282.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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A. Predictability of Results
Two ideals underlie this consideration. First, "the decision in the
litigation on a given set of facts should be the same regardless of where
the litigation occurs, so that 'forum shopping' will benefit neither
party."59  Second, "parties to a consensual transaction [i.e., contract
cases] should be able to know at the time they engage upon it that it will
produce, by way of legal consequences, the same set of socio-economic
consequences... regardless of where disputes occur. They should be
able to plan their transaction as one with predictable results."'
B. Maintenance of Interstate and International Order
Interstate order can best be achieved by "systematization" and "an
orderliness that will make our federal system work with reasonable effi-
ciency in the complicated choice-of-law field."'" The law must ensure
"free and unpenalized movement of people and goods from state to
state, and freedom in commercial intercourse."6 2 This means that when
a "sister state's substantial concern with the problem gives it a real in-
terest in having its law applied, even though the forum state also has an
identifiable interest," the forum court should give deference to sister
state law.' Leflar thus rejects "deliberate employment of forum prefer-
ence... since on its face it leaves interstate and international concerns
out of account.""
International concerns are often addressed by federal constitutional
provisions and "the inherent federal control over foreign and national
affairs" which place "outer limits on the states beyond which they must
not go in interfering with basic requisites to international and interstate
orderliness."5 Where such limits do not exist, courts should properly
consider sovereignty claims and "factors affecting relationships between
states and nations."' 6
C. Simplification of the Judicial Task
"An easy clich6 is that law does not exist for the convenience of the
59. Id. at 282-83.
60. Id at 283 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 286.
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 286-87.
64. Id. at 287.
65. I. at 286.
66. IM.
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court that administers it, but for society and its members; therefore,
simplification of the judicial task should be a minor consideration in de-
termining what any rule of law should be."67 Despite this platitude, Le-
flar acknowledges that complicated, complex rules of law may contrib-
ute to the very real problem of overcrowded dockets and may result in
misapplication even by "reasonably competent courts."6 Ease of appli-
cation "is without question a good reason for a court's applying its own
procedural rules, since it would be utterly impracticable for a court in F
[forum] to import the whole procedural machinery and technique of X
even in a case that is otherwise clearly governed by X law. 69 But when
the rule is "an outcome-determinative one that would be no harder for
the F court to apply than any other X rule of substantive law," the court
should not rely upon ease of application and simplification merely to
apply its own law.7'
"[O]ne of the most fruitful and expandable methods of simplifying
choice of law" is to minimize conflicts problems by eliminating false
conflicts, Leflar suggests.] False conflicts occur when "the laws of both
states, relevant to the set of facts, are the same, or would produce the
same decision in the lawsuit."72  Thus only conflicting outcome-
determinative rules present true conflicts.
D. Advancement of the Forum's Governmental Interests
When a court is able to identify the governmental interests of its
own state and can "effectuate these interests," it is reasonable for a
court to do so.' Identifying these interests requires "thoughtful and in-
telligent analysis of the legal materials in the light of current socio-
economic, cultural, and political attitudes in the community" and should
not be lightly undertaken.74 Courts must put "together (a) the reasons
supporting the rule of law in question (Fs or X's law) and (b) the state's
(Fs or X's) factual contacts with a case, or the issue in a case, to see if
67. Id at 288.
68. Id
69. Id (emphasis added).
70. l
71. 1l at 289.
72 Id. at 290. In contrast, "where one state's contacts with a set of facts are few and
relatively insignificant as compared with those of another state whose law is different," a true
conflict exists, and a choice of law, albeit an easy one, will need to be made. "That is an easy
conflicts case, not a false one." Id. at 289-90.
73. Id. at 290.
74. Id. at 291.
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they match."75 If, after careful analysis, the court finds that two (or
more) states "really have opposing governmental interests, then ad-
vancement of the forum's interests as against those of the other state
must be accepted as a legitimate part (but not all) of the choice-of-law
process."76
E. Application of the Better Rule of Law
This consideration is the most controversial. Professor Weintraub
writes, "To tell a court to select the 'better' rule, the 'more just' rule, is
to give the court a standard which may be all things to all men, to direct
it to rest its decision upon 'a slender and treacherous reed.'""
Yet Leflar asserts that that is exactly what courts do. "Superiority
of one rule of law over another, in terms of socio-economic jurispruden-
tial standards, is far from being the whole basis for choice of law, yet it
is without question one of the relevant considerations." 78 After all,
"[j]ustice... has always been one of the objectives of law. 79 And a
choice between competing rules of law is preferable-"more imper-
sonal, less subjective"-than a choice between competing parties in thelitigation?8
Although a search for the "better law" may well lead a court to its
own law, "it does not amount to an automatic preference for local law,
nor is an automatic preference justifiable."81 Judges may in fact recog-
nize their own laws as anachronistic and choose to apply the law of their
sister state. In any event, "[e]very judge and lawyer knows that our
courts have engaged in [this choice of one set of laws over another]
from time immemorial, and that it was right for them to do so."'  Far
better to manipulate results through the substance/procedure distinc-
tion, or other escape devices, than to "disregard superiority in rules of
law altogether." Better yet to openly address and apply this considera-
tion, along with the others included in Leflar's list. Leflar cautions,
75. Id.
76. d. at 295 (emphasis added).
77. Russell J. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems, supra note 46, at 585
(quoting Elliot E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 959, 980 (1952)).
78. Leflar, supra note 44, at 296.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 296-97.
81. Id. at 299.
82. Id. at 302.
83. Id. at 302-03.
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however, that this consideration should not outweigh the other four; "it
is only one of the five, more important in some types of cases than in
others, almost controlling in some but far in the background in oth-
ers. 118
4
Leflar's five choice-influencing considerations are not to be priori-
tized. "Their relative importance varies according to the area of law in-
volved. Some will be more important in one area of law, others in an-
other. But all should be considered regardless of the area.,
85
III. WISCONSIN'S REJECTION OF TRADITIONAL CHOICE OF LAW
PRINCIPLES
Initially, Wisconsin did not follow traditional choice of law princi-
ples. In 1875 it affirmed its adherence to lex fori-the law of the fo-
rum-"almost too familiar a principle for discussion or authority.""
But in 1904, the Wisconsin Supreme Court joined the majority of states
in adopting the traditional principles set forth above and later adopted
in the first Restatement, Conflict of Laws." For sixty-one years, Wis-
consin courts followed this mainstream territorial approach to choice of
law.
But the choice of law revolution in the 1960s did not pass Wisconsin
courts unnoticed. In 1965, the Wisconsin Supreme Court joined the
revolution, rejecting traditional choice of law analysis in Wilcox v. Wil-
cox." Although the court was clear in its rejection, it was not so clear in
articulating a new analytical standard.
The facts in Wilcox were straightforward. The plaintiff, Mrs. Wil-
cox, a Wisconsin resident, sued her husband, also a Wisconsin resident,
and his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Company,
"organized, licensed, and domiciled in the state of Wisconsin," under an
insurance policy "issued and delivered" in Wisconsin on a car "usually
garaged in and used in Wisconsin."89 She sued for injuries suffered as a
passenger in an automobile driven by Mr. Wilcox in Nebraska.' Ne-
braska's guest statute precluded a host's liability unless the guest could
prove "gross negligence or intoxication of the host,"'" factors notably
84. Id. at 304.
85. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAW 195 (3d ed. 1977).
86. Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 37 Wis. 321,322 (1875).
87. Bain v. Northern Pacific R.R., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 241 (1904).
88. 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
89. Id. at 619, 133 N.W.2d at 409.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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absent in the complaint. Wisconsin has never had a guest statute, and
therefore ordinary negligence would suffice for a finding of liability.
Under the traditional principle of lex loci delicti, the trial court had
no difficulty in determining that Nebraska law would apply as the place
of injury, and it sustained a demurrer to the complaint. But on appeal,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wisconsin law
should govern. It specifically overruled prior cases "that hold that the
proper choice-of-law rule invariably is lex loci delicti." Instead, it
called for "a reasonable and flexible approach that will allow the use of
lex loci delicti, lex fori, or a combination of the two or the law of a third
state if it is in the interests of sound legal administration and justice to
do so."" The court asserted, hopefully but prematurely, that its new
approach would be "practical and workable."94
The court rejected traditional principles for two reasons: the absurd
results they produced and their failure to provide certainty of result.
The Wisconsin court noted the "absurd and unjust" result in Walton v.
Arabian American Oil Co.95 In that case an American employee sued
his American employer for injuries sustained while driving his em-
ployer's vehicle in Saudi Arabia. Even though neither party had pled
foreign law, the court held that Saudi Arabian law should apply.96
The Wisconsin court also cited its own case of Haumschild v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co.' to demonstrate that traditional principles failed to
produce the certainty that presumably sustained their efficacy. There,
the court just six years earlier had held that Wisconsin law governed an
automobile accident dispute that had taken place in California." In so
holding, the court cast the dispute not as a tort, which would have re-
quired application of lex loci delicti, but as an interspousal immunity
question, involving family law.99 Thus recharacterized, the court found
that the law of the domicile (here, Wisconsin) "governs the capacity of
one spouse to sue the other in tort."1®
The Wisconsin court in Wilcox additionally noted that traditional
92. Id. at 621,133 N.W.2d at 410.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 622, 133 N.W.2d at 411 (citing Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d
541 (2d Cir. 1956)).
96. Walton, 233 F.2d at 541.
97. 7 Wis. 2d 130,95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 137-38,95 N.W.2d at 815-18.
100. Id. at 138, 95 N.W.2d at 818.
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principles often gave way to a state's "public policy"'10' and that
"[c]ourts have resorted to characterization of the action as one of con-
tract rather than tort or one involving matters of procedure rather than
substance in order to [reach] ... a just result."' 2
The decision in Wilcox appears to be restricted to tort cases, where
predictability is not very important: "persons will rarely, if ever, give
advance thought to the legal consequences of their actions."' '  The
court noted that "the rule being discarded is one lying in the field of
conflict of laws as applied to torts,"'" as it appeared in the then-current
first Restatement, section 378, i.e., lex loci delicti.'0'
The court, having thoroughly rejected lex loci delicti, now had to
provide an alternative method of analysis. In doing so, it conducted a
fairly exhaustive, albeit unreliable, 1' survey of modern conflicts law.
The court also cautioned, "In discussing these theories, we do not mean
to intimate that we intend to follow any of them in their entirety."'0'
The court began with Brainerd Currie's governmental interest
analysis, "which requires the forum state to apply its law if it has any le-
gitimate policy interest." The court continued: "The lex loci [law of
the place of injury] should be applied only if the forum has no inter-
est."'1 9 But then the court plainly misstated Currie's theory: "[I]f the
forum state has no legitimate interest and if other states have competing
interests, then the law of the forum should govern.""0 This can only be
deemed a clerical error. The court could not have meant that forum law
should apply in the absence of any legitimate forum interest and when
another state has a legitimate interest. In such cases, Currie advocates
the application of the other state's law.
101. 26 Wis. 2d at 623, 133 N.W.2d at 411.
102. Id. at 624-25, 133 N.W.2d at 412 (quoting James R. Bridges & William D. Segal,
Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 762, 770
(1963)).
103. Id. at 624, 133 N.W.2d at 412 (quoting Willis Reese, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflicts of Law, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1254 (1963)).
104. ldt at 625, 133 N.W.2d at 412 (quoting Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7
Wis. 2d at 137-38,95 N.W.2d at 818).
105. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d at 625, 133 N.W.2d at 412 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 378 (1934)).
106. See infra text accompanying n.110.
107. 26 Wis. 2d at 626 n.12, 133 N.W.2d at 413 n.12.
108. Id. at 626, 133 N.W.2d at 413 (citing Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Ob-
jectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE LJ. 171).
109. ld
110. Id
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The Wisconsin court then reviewed the choice of law theories of
Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig..' and Russell Weintraub."' Finally,
the court discussed the then-tentative draft of the Restatement
(Second) of the Conflict of Laws, which adopted the "most significant
relationship" test. The court focused on two sections of the Restate-
ment. The first provides that the "'local law of the state which has the
most-significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties
determines' the [parties'] rights and liabilities."1 4 That section also pro-
vides a list of the relevant contacts which contribute to that relation-
ship."5 The second section provides a presumption that the law of the
place of injury shall apply in tort cases, "'unless some other state has a
more significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties.'1 .6
The court next attempted to articulate its own choice of law theory,
drawing from several of the approaches. It incorporated the "most sig-
nificant relationship" standard from the Restatement (Second). But
"the mere counting of contacts should not be determinative of the law
to be applied. It is rather the relevancy of the contact in the terms of
policy considerations important to the forum, vis-a-vis, other contact
states."'1 7 In other words, "in order to determine the 'most-significant
relationship' consideration should be given to the policies and interests
of the forum state, the tort state, and of other states that may have an
interest."1
8
This reference to policy considerations implicates Currie's govern-
111. Id. at 626-27, 133 N.W.2d at 413 (citing Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the
Conflict of Laws: Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable
Laws," 69 YALE LJ. 595 (1960)).
112. Id. at 627, 133 N.W.2d at 413 (citing Russell J. Weintraub, A Method for Solving
Conflict Problems: Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963)).
113. Id. at 628, 133 N.W.2d at 415 (citing Tentative Draft No. 9 of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (2d), § 379). The Restatement provisions discussed in Wilcox were adopted
as §§ 145 and 146 in the final Restatement, with minor changes in wording. See RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145,146 (1971).
114. Id. at 628, 133 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting Tentative Draft No. 9 of the RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (2d), § 379. This section now appears as § 145 in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict OF LAWS (1971)).
115. Id., 133 N.W.2d at 413-14. The relevant contacts are: place of injury; place of con-
duct; domicile, nationality, place of incorporation, place of business; place where the rela-
tionship is centered. The Restatement as later adopted also includes the parties' residence.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(c)(1971).
116. Id., 133 N.W.2d at 414 (quoting Tentative Draft No. 9, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d) § 379a). This provision was adopted as § 146 in the final draft.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971).
117. 26 Wis. 2d at 633-34, 133 N.W.2d at 416.
118. Id. at 631,133 N.W.2d at 415 (emphasis added).
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mental interest analysis, and, in fact, the court's own reasoning demon-
strated this analysis. The court examined the policy underlying Ne-
braska's guest statute and Wisconsin's policy of liability for ordinary
negligence. It asked whether either of these state policies would be
served by the application of their own law and found that "Wisconsin is
the state most intimately and significantly concerned with the disposi-
tion of [the] issue... 9
But, in addition to the combination of Restatement (Second) and
governmental interest analysis, the court continued: "We start with the
premise that if the forum state is concerned it will not favor the applica-
tion of a rule of law repugnant to its own policies, and that the law of
the forum should presumptively apply unless it becomes clear that non-
forum contacts are of the greater significance."' 2 Here, the court re-
placed the Restatement's presumptive place-of-injury law with
Ehrenzweig's presumptive forum law.
In the end, the court applied Wisconsin law to this dispute, adopting
what it called the "most significant relationship" or "center of gravity"
or "grouping of contacts" test.121 It envisioned that "generalizations will
soon become apparent" and that the new standard would serve as "a
guide to the future to provide a uniform common law of conflicts."
1 2
That vision did not last long. In fact, it took nearly ten years-and a
dozen cases-for the court to articulate a fairly well-defined, precise
choice-of-law methodology. And that methodology still has not led to a
uniform Wisconsin common law of conflicts.
IV. WISCONSIN'S ADOPTION OF LEFLAR'S THEORY
Just two years later, the state's highest court had before it another
case involving a negligent host driver and her ungrateful guest. But the
facts seemed to represent the flip side of Wilcox. In Wilcox, the host-
guest relationship arose in Wisconsin between two Wisconsin residents,
with the accident occurring in Nebraska. The court applied Wisconsin
law. Now, two years later, in Heath v. Zellmer," both host and guest
119. 1d& at 633, 133 N.W.2d at 415-16. Currie would call this a false conflict.
120. Id. at 634, 133 N.W.2d at 416.
121. See id. at 634-35, 133 N.W.2d at 416-17. "Other courts applying a similar reasoning
have referred to their solution as a 'center of gravity' or a 'grouping of contacts.' .... [Tihey
are ... meaningful 'short-hand' phrases for the expression of the rule that we adopt." Id. at
635, 133 N.W.2d at 417.
122. Id. at 635, 133 N.W.2d at 417.
123. 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
[Vol. 81:761
WISCONSIN'S CHOICE OF LAW
were non-residents,"24 and the relationship was formed in Indiana, which
at that time had a guest statute precluding host liability except where
the conduct was "wanton or wilful."' The accident occurred in Wis-
consin. Relying on the analysis and holding in Wilcox, the host-driver
moved for summary judgment, assuming that Indiana's guest statute
was the proper governing law."
She certainly had reason to rely on the court finding in her favor. In
Wilcox, the court had noted:
All of the parties, including the liability insurer, are domiciled in
Wisconsin. None of them can claim surprise upon permitting a
suit for ordinary negligence between host and guest. This is the
law that in the ordinary course of events would have been ap-
plied if the accident had occurred in Wisconsin. That it occurred
outside was merely fortuitous, and should not now inure as a
windfall to any of the defendants. The policy was issued for a
Wisconsin-garaged automobile in contemplation of possible li-
ability under Wisconsin law, and we find that the insurer in this
case is bound by his bargain. The law of Wisconsin is the law of
the place whose application was "anticipated and insured
against. , ' 2'
But in Heath, the relevant parties were non-residents, the driver
from Ohio, the passengers from Indiana. Both Ohio and Indiana had
guest statutes. The automobile was licensed and insured in Indiana by
an Indiana insurer." That the accident occurred in Wisconsin was
merely fortuitous29; the Indiana residents were visiting Wisconsin rela-
tives.m But the Wisconsin court again applied Wisconsin law in an
opinion authored by Justice Heffernan, the same judge who wrote the
opinion in Wilcox.
The court distinguished Wilcox by noting that in this case another
driver, a Wisconsin resident, was involved and that three additional pas-
sengers (non-parties) were Wisconsin residents. The court then clearly
124. The host was domiciled in Ohio, the guest in Indiana. However, Ohio's law was
the same as Indiana's and so was not given separate consideration. See id. at 585, 589 n.3,
151 N.W.2d at 666-67, 669 n.3.
125. Id, at 586,151 N.W.2d at 667 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 47-1021).
126. Ida t 586,588; 151 N.W.2d at 667,668.
127. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d at 632-33, 133 N.W.2d at 416 (quoting Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability
Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE LJ. 595, 603 (1960)).
128. Heath, 35 Wis. 2d at 585, 151 N.W.2d at 666.
129. Id. at 589,151 N.W.2d at 668.
130. See id. at 585, 151 N.W.2d at 666.
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applied Currie's governmental interest analysis to determine if this case
involved a "true conflict."'' It examined the policies underlying Wis-
consin and Indiana law, found that "each [state] has important policies
that it believes will be furthered by the application of its law,' 32 and
thus a true conflict existed.
Significantly absent from this opinion was any mention of the Re-
statement (Second). Now the court appeared to back away from the
Wilcox analysis, finding that "[t]he Wilcox Case, although pointing to a
methodology for making a choice of law where a conflict exists, was
primarily pointed to the Wilcox determination, i.e., does a serious con-
flict in fact exist?', 3
3
Suggesting that the "most significant interest" test adopted by the
court just two years earlier had proven unsuccessful elsewhere,L14 the
court stated that it "should be expected to approach conflicts problems
in a consistent manner so that its decisions will not only have preceden-
tial value for its own decision making but also can serve as a guide to
the bench and bar as well.', 35 Citing a law review article published just
one year earlier, the court adopted the choice-influencing considera-
tions proposed by Robert A. Leflar in that article.36
Carefully applying Leflar's five considerations, the court concluded
that Wisconsin law applied. First, it asserted that "predictability of re-
sults" rarely has relevance to automobile accidents or other unplanned
and unintentional torts.'Y Leflar would agree, at least "in the sense of
serving as a guide to the conduct of the parties .... Parties do not plan
this sort of tort.' ' 3' But Leflar noted that two ideals underlie this con-
131. Id at 592, 151 N.W.2d at 670.
132. Id, 151 N.W.2d at 670.
133. Id at 593, 151 N.W.2d at 671.
134. Since rejection of traditional analysis, "legal commentators have sought some
method that preserves the certainty of the old rule and the rationality of the 'center of grav-
ity'-'grouping of contracts [sic]'-'most significant interest' series of cases that followed it.
They have not succeeded, nor is it likely that they will." Id at 594, 151 N.W.2d at 671.
135. Id, 151 N.W.2d at 671.
136. Id. at 595-96, 151 N.W.2d at 671-72 (citing Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, supra note 44, at 267). The five considerations are: (1) pre-
dictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification
of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; (5) application of
the better rule of law. Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d at 596, 151 N.W.2d at 672 (citing Leflar,
Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, supra note 44, at 282). See supra note
52-85 and text accompanying notes for a discussion of these considerations.
137. Id at 596, 151 N.W.2d at 672.
138. Leflar, supra note 44, at 310-11.
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sideration," and the Wisconsin court ignored the first: "the decision in
the litigation on a given set of facts should be the same regardless of
where the litigation occurs, so that 'forum shopping' will benefit neither
party." Leflar himself suggested, in an example included in the article
cited by the Wisconsin court, that "[p]redictability of the territorial
scope of liability might have had bearing on liability insurance premi-
ums" before the event, and "[a]fter the event, if the governing law were
clearly known, forum shopping would be inhibited, which is of some
importance.""' The Wisconsin court ignored these aspects of predict-
ability.
It may well be that the Indiana insurance company, in establishing
insurance premiums for the car (garaged and insured in Indiana), did
not consider Indiana's guest statute. But it may have, and the decision
reached by this Wisconsin court disserved the ability to predict results
and set insurance premiums accordingly. Although forum shopping
most likely played no role in this case,' the court might also have at
least considered it.
Second, concerning the "maintenance of interstate and international
order," the court recognized that a "state whose interest is negligible
should not attempt to displace the law of a state whose interest is sub-
stantial, and the choice of law should not be a mere forum preference in
disregard of the competing rationales behind diverse foreign and forum
laws."' 42 But such was not the case here, as Leflar also recognized in the
context of a guest statute hypothetical provided in his earlier work. In
his hypothetical, he recognized that "[i]nterstate relationships ... in the
federal system, including interstate travel by residents of various states,
will not be appreciably affected whichever law is applied."'"
Third, relying again on Leflar's examples, the court found that
139. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
140. Leflar, supra note 44, at 311.
141. Plaintiffs were two Indiana passengers-a mother and her daughter-in the Indi-
ana car. They sued the Wisconsin driver of the other vehicle. The Wisconsin driver im-
pleaded the driver of the Indiana car-a second daughter-for contribution. Heath, 35 Wis.
2d at 589-90, 151 N.W.2d at 668-69. If Indiana's guest statute applied, this family member
would receive protection for her ordinary negligence. Thus, in the initial suit, had the plain-
tiffs foreseen the guest statute issue, they likely would have chosen to file suit in Indiana, to
protect their own driver. However, they may not have been able to choose a forum even if
they wanted to, since it is unlikely that Indiana would have had personal jurisdiction over the
Wisconsin driver.
142. ImL at 596-97, 151 N.W.2d at 672.
143. See Leflar, supra note 44, at 314-15 (demonstrating an application of his considera-
tions in twelve hypothetical cases).
144. Id at 315.
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"simplification of the judicial task" is a consideration of "minimal im-
portance" in an automobile accident case. But the court added,
"Nevertheless, a court's task is rarely simplified when the lawyers and
judges must apply themselves to foreign rather than forum law., 145 Le-
flar recognized such a temptation and cautioned against it: "[T]he rea-
sons of practicality.., stop short when the rule in question is an out-
come-determinative one that would be no harder for the [forum] court
to apply than any other [state's] rule of substantive law."' 146 And in his
guest statute hypothetical, Leflar found that a forum court could apply
either law "with about equal ease."'47
Fourth, the court considered "advancement of the forum's govern-
mental interest." The court could not resist favoring its own law, a
sound position given the trend away from guest statutes. But that was
not the reason provided for forum preference. Instead, the court re-
ferred to Wilcox, in which it said "that the forum law is presumptively
applicable unless there are nonforum contacts that are of greater sig-
nificance."' ' Here, the driver and passengers of the Indiana car were
not residents of Wisconsin, and the car was garaged and insured in Indi-
ana. The court must-and did-admit that Indiana was also a con-
cerned jurisdiction, yet "forum law should continue to be a primary
concern of the forum court for 'Courts are instruments of state pol-
icy...' and it is the duty of a Wisconsin court to identify and effectuate
Wisconsin policies.',
49
The court was quick to note that nonforum law may, in some cases,
"best serve the interest of the state as a justice-seeking jurisdiction," as,
for example, when the forum's law consisted of anachronistic common
lawY° But, "[i]f it appears that the application of forum law will ad-
vance the governmental interest of the forum state, this fact becomes a
major, though not in itself a determining, factor in the ultimate choice
of law.'' What is the governmental interest in this case? Wisconsin
apparently cares about compensating the Indiana passengers, about de-
terring the Ohio driver's negligent conduct on Wisconsin roads, and
about providing contribution to the Wisconsin driver, if he is found
145. 35 Wis. 2d at 597, 151 N.W.2d at 673.
146. Leflar, supra note 44, at 288.
147. Id. at 315.
148. 35 Wis. 2d at 597, 151 N.W.2d at 673.
149. I. (quoting Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d at 633, 133 N.W.2d at 416).
150. 1& at 597-98, 151 N.W.2d at 673.
151. Ia (emphasis added).
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negligent."
Finally, the court addressed the fifth consideration, "application of
the better rule of law." By now, it was apparent which law this court
believed to be "better." "The Indiana law is an anachronism,"'1 a con-
clusion that other courts had reached about guest statutes in general.
Thus, the Wisconsin court in Heath v. Zellmer adopted a new choice
of law analysis, joining the courts of only one other state at that time,
New Hampshire.' In doing so, the Wisconsin court utilized Currie's
governmental interest analysis to first determine whether a true conflict
existed, then seemed to cling to its strong forum law preference, while
at the same time attempting to carefully apply Leflar's five choice-
influencing considerations.
V. WISCONSIN'S EVOLVING APPLICATION OF LEFLAR'S THEORY
The Wisconsin Supreme Court had the opportunity to revisit its
newly-adopted choice of law analysis three times within the next year.
In the first case, Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Company,'55 the court
attempted to explain the current state of conflicts law in Wisconsin. It
correctly observed that Wisconsin had rejected both lex loci delicti and
lex fori. 6 But it also asserted that the traditional rule "was abandoned
in its entirety as a mechanically determinative rule in conflict cases
whether such cases involved torts or contracts or other subject matter,"''
despite language to the contrary in Wilcox that seemed to restrict its
application to tort cases.58
The court stated: "We then adopted the rule contemplated by Ten-
tative Draft No. 9 of the Restatement 2d... commonly referred to as
the 'center of gravity,' 'grouping of contacts,' or 'dominant interest' rule
or the 'interest oriented' or 'interest analysis' approach." '159 The court
failed to draw distinctions between Restatement (Second) and Currie's
152. Id at 592,599-601, 151 N.W.2d at 670,674-75.
153. Ia at 602, 151 N.W.2d at 675.
154. See Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N. H. 1966).
155. 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
156. Id. at 103-04,156 N.W.2d at 468.
157. Id. at 105,156 N.W.2d at 469 (emphasis added).
158. Wilcox involved only tort issues. See Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408
(1965). Throughout the opinion, the court's references are to tort cases only. And in reject-
ing lex loci delicti, the court quoted from Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d
130, 137; 95 N.W.2d 814, 818: "'.... the rule being discarded is one lying in the field of con-
flict of laws as applied to torts so that there can hardly have been any action taken by the par-
ties in reliance upon it."' 26 Wis. 2d at 625, 133 N.W.2d at 412 (emphasis added).
159. 38 Wis. 2d at 105, 156 N.W.2d at 469.
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interest analysis.
In dealing with Heath v. Zellmer,'" the court explained that it
"moved to the next problem since Wilcox only involved Wisconsin resi-
dents in a one-car accident in Nebraska.... The court then noted that it
adopted Leflar's analysis .' Now, the court offered this confusing direc-
tive:
All these guides [the Leflar choice-influencing considerations]
should be considered in each case regardless of its area in the
law and their relative importance will vary according to the pre-
cise issue involved. Under this approach the lex fori is not a
choice-influencing consideration as such but is a weak presump-
tion to be used as a starting point in applying the conflict-of-law
rule adopted in Wilcox but which is not a part of the five choice-
influencing considerations adopted in Heath. This analysis is
somewhat analogous to the determination of the comparison of
causal negligence under our doctrine of comparative negligence
in that it is not the number of respects in which negligence may
be found (quantitative) but the contribution (qualitative) of the
negligence to the cause which determines the outcome.
1 63
The court then analyzed the instant case which involved Illinois
plaintiffs, a Wisconsin defendant and its Wisconsin insurer, and a third
party Illinois insurer. The relevant issues concerned interspousal im-
munity, parental immunity, and the guest statute. The court applied an
abbreviated version of interest analysis"' to arrive at the conclusion that
this case represented a true conflict, and it then applied the five Leflar
choice-influencing considerations, concluding that Wisconsin law ap-
plied.1 61 In doing so, the court focused primarily on the last two consid-
erations, advancement of the forum state's interest and application of
the better law.
Regarding the first, the court noted that Illinois had a guest statute,
interspousal immunity, and parental immunity, none of which Wiscon-
160. 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
161. 38 Wis. 2d at 105, 156 N.W.2d at 469.
162. l at 106, 156 N.W.2d at 469.
163. Il at 106-07, 156 N.W.2d at 469-70 (footnote omitted). The author of the opinion,
Chief Justice Hallows, noted that he would abandon the forum presumption "and would ap-
ply the standards of Heath from scratch." kla t 106 n.1, 156 N.W.2d at 470 n.1.
164. The court said only: "there is no question that both Illinois and Wisconsin have
contacts with the tortious occurrence. Unlike in Wilcox, we here are presented with a serious
conflict because of the basic and significant repugnance of the underlying state interests in-
volved." Id at 107, 156 N.W.2d at 470.
165. I& at 107, 156 N.W.2d at 470.
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sin had, nor did it ever have.' Thus, the court asserted, "Wisconsin
public policy in this area is to the contrary,' '67 and Wisconsin's "moral
considerations"-"to promote the spreading of the risk and fasten li-
ability in torts on a moral basis of fault"-."leave little room for a justi-
fication of immunity for collateral reasons."'16
As for the better law, the court agreed with Heath69 that guest stat-
utes are archaic, and it believed the same could be said of interspousalimmunity, which "was based upon the common-law theory of unity of
person and that person was the husband."'"7 As for parental immunity,
"its existence works an injustice to the child. In fact, a child needs more
protection and rights from a socioeconomic view than his adult par-
ent."'' Not surprisingly, then, the court found that Wisconsin had the
better law in all three areas and Wisconsin law applied.'
Less than six weeks later, in Conklin v. Homer,'73 the court again
faced tort issues involving choice of law. Justice Heffernan, the author
of the opinions in both Wilcox' 4 and Heath,'' authored this opinion as
well. Again, the court applied Wisconsin law, this time in a case in-
volving (1) only Illinois parties, (2) an Illinois car insured by an insur-
ance policy issued in Illinois, (3) an Illinois guest statute, and (4) a trip
originating and ending in Illinois, which "fortuitously" occurred in Wis-
consin.
This case, like Heath v. Zellmer,' appeared to represent the flip side
of Wilcox, where all the parties and their insurers were connected with
Wisconsin and the only Nebraska connection was as the place of injury.
The court in that case applied the law of the only state that had an in-
terest: Wisconsin. But in Conklin, all the parties and their insurers
were connected with Illinois.
The court once again attempted to articulate its newly adopted
166. Id. at 110-11, 156 N.W.2d at 471-72.
167. Ik at 111, 156 N.W.2d at 472.
168. Id at 112, 156 N.W.2d at 472. The "collateral" reasons for Illinois immunity law
are the promotion of family peace and avoidance of collusive suits (for interspousal and pa-
rental immunity), and protection of the good Samaritan (for guest statute). kla
169. 35 Wis. 2d 578,602; 151 N.W.2d 664, 675.
170. 38 Wis. 2d at 112, 156 N.W.2d at 472.
171. d, 156 N.W.2d at 473.
172. Id. at 113-14,156 N.W.2d at 473.
173. 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
174. 26 Wis. 2d 617,133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
175. 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
176. 38 Wis. 2d at 474, 157 N.W.2d at 582.
177. 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
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choice of law analysis. It again asserted that it adopted a modified ver-
sion of the Second Restatement, also known as the "'center of gravity,'
'grouping of contacts,' 'dominant interest,' 'interest oriented,' or
'interest analysis' approach." ' But the court also noted that it did "not
follow the methodology of the Restatement";'" and that what it
"adopted was not a rule, but a method of analysis that permitted dissec-
tion of the jural bundle constituting a tort and its environment to de-
termine what elements therein were relevant to a reasonable choice oflaw.5518
If the court had approached this case as it did the facts in Wilcox, it
would first have applied governmental interest analysis. Unlike the
facts in Wilcox, where the accident occurred on the roads of a state
which had a guest statute, in Conklin the accident occurred on a Wis-
consin road, in a state without a guest statute. Thus, here the court
might have found that, although in Wilcox Nebraska had no policy that
would be advanced by application of its law,'8' Wisconsin in the instant
case did have an interest--deterrence of negligent driving-that would
be advanced by the application of its law. Thus, both Illinois and Wis-
consin had policies that would be advanced by application of their laws,
and a true conflict existed. The court then would have had to apply the
true conflict analysis adopted in Heath, i.e., Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations.
Instead, the court in Conklin unnecessarily began its analysis with a
strong forum law presumption: "Wisconsin is a seriously concerned ju-
risdiction" because "it is the forum as well. Thus, this court is specially
charged as an instrument of the Wisconsin government to further the
interests of Wisconsin, if to do so furthers the underlying policies of our
law.""' Although the court just weeks earlier referred to the "weak" fo-
rum law presumption, '8 3 this court asserted that
the strength of the presumption is irrelevant, since its only pur-
178. 38 Wis. 2d at 473, 157 N.W.2d at 581 (quoting Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co.,
38 Wis. 2d at 105, 156 N.W.2d at 469).
179. 38 Wis. 2d at 473 n.1, 157 N.W.2d at 581 n.1.
180. Id. at 474, 157 N.W.2d at 581.
181. In Wilcox, all the parties and their insurers were from Wisconsin. See 26 Wis. 2d
617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). The accident occurred in Nebraska; therefore, Nebraska's only
interest would have been highway safety and the deterrence of negligent driving. But its
guest statute protected negligent drivers, thereby undermining whatever deterrence policy
might otherwise have been advanced. Nebraska had no policy which would be advanced by
application of its guest statute.
182. 38 Wis. 2d at 475, 157 N.W.2d at 582.
183. Zelinger, 38 Wis. 2d at 106, 156 N.W.2d at 469.
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pose is to trigger the responsibility of the court to carry out the
forum state's policy unless it appears that the forum state's poli-
cies are unaffected by using a nonforum rule, or unless the facts
show that the contacts with the tort are so minimal that the use
of forum law would be clearly the result of interloping chauvin-
In other words, the forum should favor its policy if competing poli-
cies are in any way outcome determinative. And yet the court asserted
that the forum presumption can be overcome if "'it becomes clear that
nonforum contacts are of the greater significance,' 18 apparently even if
the forum's policy would be affected.
The court then examined the policies underlying the law of each
state to determine whether a conflict existed and found that Wisconsin
did indeed have a deterrent interest to protect, in addition to its concern
for compensating all injured persons, even nonresidents. It was easy,
then, to find "that a serious conflict arises,. 86 necessitating application
of the Leflar considerations.
The first consideration, predictability of result, received little con-
sideration because people do not plan to commit torts. Insurance plan-
ning also played little role, because 1) the parties' Illinois county bor-
ders Wisconsin and interstate travel must therefore have been
contemplated; 2) the insurance company's name was "Nationwide Mu-
tual," "hardly indicative that [the company] relied solely upon local
laws for setting its rates"; and 3) the accident occurred at a time when
lex loci delicti was the rule and the parties would have contemplated the
application of Wisconsin law, if they contemplated it at all. 7 The court
did mention the possibility of forum shopping, but noted that the case
was filed prior to Wilcox;.. the court did not acknowledge that a strong
forum law presumption may contribute to forum shopping in the future.
The second consideration, maintenance of interstate order and
comity, received much of the court's attention, as it must in this case of
strong Illinois contacts. The court noted that the two states' competing
policies may in fact not be as outcome determinative as might be ex-
pected, because recent Illinois cases and scholarship demonstrated that
Illinois's negligence standard under its guest statute (willful and wan-
184. 38 Wis. 2d at 475 n.2,157 N.W.2d at 582 n.2 (emphasis added).
185. IE at 475, 157 N.W.2d at 582 (quoting Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d at 634, 133 N.W.2d at
416).
186. Id. at 477, 157 N.W.2d at 583.
187. Ial at 478, 157 N.W.2d at 584.
188. Id. at 479 n.6,157 N.W.2d at 584 n.6.
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ton) was "'used to define a vague and somewhat shadowy area close to
ordinary negligence."'189 In addition, Wisconsin's interests were more
than "minimal," and application of Wisconsin law to Illinois drivers was
"not likely to reduce the likelihood that Illinois hosts will continue to
drive into Wisconsin with their guests."' The court found "no burden
upon interstate movement."' 9 Nor did the court believe that Illinois
courts would retaliate, subjecting Wisconsin drivers and their guests to
Illinois law in an Illinois forum.'2
The court then applied the last three factors. As in Heath and
Zelinger, the court noted that "simplification of the judicial task" plays
little role in guest statute cases, and that it believed Wisconsin had the
"better law."'93 As for "advancement of the forum's governmental in-
terests," the court deemed this, not surprisingly, "[o]ne of the most
relevant considerations."'' The court even considered that applying Il-
linois law might violate equal protection, providing a remedy for ordi-
nary negligence to its own citizens, but denying it to others.'95 And, fi-
nally, the court wished to deter the drivers of those 21,699 out-of-state
vehicles who were involved in accidents on Wisconsin roads in 1966, in-
cluding the 3,655 from Illinois.'96
After this case, it is difficult to see why the court continued to be-
lieve that the Restatement (Second) played any role at all in its choice-
of-law methodology. As the dissent noted, "If we were to follow the
Restatement 2d... we would apply the law of Illinois to the present
facts for the reason that Illinois has more significant relationships to the
particular issue here involved than Wisconsin."'17 But in fact the court
did not follow the Restatement. It applied interest analysis to deter-
mine if a true conflict existed, and, if so, the court began with a strong
forum preference, supplemented with Leflar's choice-influencing con-
siderations.
Two-and-a-half months after Conklin, the court had to decide
whether its choice of law analysis applied as well to contract issues. In
189. Id. at 480, 157 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting Spivack v. Hara, 216 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Il1.
App. 1966)).
190. 38 Wis. 2d at 481,157 N.W.2d at 585.
191. Id.
192. Id at 479, 157 N.W.2d at 584.
193. d at 481,483, 157 N.W.2d at 585,586.
194. Id at 481, 157 N.W.2d at 585.
195. Id at 482, 157 N.W.2d at 586.
196. Id at 483, 157 N.W.2d at 586.
197. Id at 491, 157 N.W.2d at 590 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
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Urhammer v. Olson,19 JoAnn Urhammer, a Minnesota plaintiff-
passenger in one car, sued Charles Olson, the Wisconsin driver of an-
other car and his insurer. The defendants impleaded Edward Urham-
mer, JoAnn's Minnesota husband and driver of the first car, and his in-
surer. Mr. Urhammer's insurance policy, written and delivered in
Minnesota, contained a family-exclusion clause, valid in Minnesota but
not in Wisconsin. The key issue involved the validity of this clause.'"
The court now asserted that it had not yet had an opportunity to de-
cide choice of law methodology for contractsa despite statements to
the contrary in Zelinger.20' It affirmed its rejection of lex loci contractus
and adopted the "grouping-of-contacts" methodology,n which it had
earlier equated with the Restatement (Second). 3 But the court made
no mention of the Restatement (Second), no mention of its applicable
presumptive rule for contract issuese nor its choice-of-law principles2°5
198. 39 Wis. 2d 447,159 N.W.2d 688 (1968).
199. Id. at 448-49, 159 N.W.2d at 688-89.
200. Id. at 450, 159 N.W.2d at 689.
201. See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 105; 156 N.W.2d 466, 469:
In Wilcox, the traditional "rule was abandoned in its entirety ... whether such cases involved
torts or contracts or other subject matter. We then adopted the rule contemplated by Tenta-
tive Draft No. 9 of the Restatement 2d... commonly referred to as the 'center of gravity,'
'grouping or contacts,' or 'dominant interest' rule or the 'interest oriented' or 'interest analy-
sis' approach."
202. 39 Wis. 2d at 450,159 N.W.2d at 689.
203. See Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d at 473, 157 N.W.2d 581 (the Restatement
(Second) "may be denominated as the 'center of gravity,' 'grouping of contacts'... ap-
proach"); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d at 105; 156 N.W.2d at 469 (the Re-
statement (Second) is "commonly referred to as the 'center of gravity,' 'grouping of con-
tacts' ... approach").
204. "If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the
same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided" in
some other section. RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(3). For casualty
insurance, Section 193 provides: "The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insur-
ance and the rights created thereby are determined by the local law of the state which the
parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the
policy, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant re-
lationship to the transaction and the parties...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 193. However, when the insured risk covers moving vehicles, "the location of the
risk can play little role" and Section 188, rather than § 193, governs. RESTATEMENT
(Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193 cmt. a.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was not officially adopted until 1971, so
the court's references to the Restatement are to Tentative Draft No. 9. This draft was simi-
lar to the current Restatement, although the section numbers vary. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26
Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965), in which the court discusses the substantive provisions
of Draft No. 9. Id. at 628, 133 N.W.2d at 413. Sections 379 and 379a, discussed therein, are
now sections 145 and 146 of the Restatement (Second).
205. See RESTATEMENT (Second) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.
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nor its "contacts to be taken into account in applying the" choice-of-law
principles. The court engaged in no interest analysis. Nor did it dem-
onstrate the least concern for Wisconsin as the forum. Instead, the
court found that all relevant contacts were with Minnesota and applied
Minnesota law.2 Clearly, the court reached the right result, but it
failed to provide a well-reasoned, analytical methodology for courts to
follow in subsequent cases.
Two years later, the court had an opportunity to supplement its de-
ficient decision and attempted to do so thoroughly and carefully.
Haines v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.' involved the same contract issue
as Urhammer, namely, whether Wisconsin or Minnesota law governed a
Minnesota family exclusion clause. But this time, the court, at least ini-
tially, relied exclusively upon the Restatement (Second) to analyze its
"grouping-of-contacts" methodology.20
Although the court ignored the Restatement's general Section 6
choice-of-law principles, 210 it carefully applied Sections 188 and 193.211 It
evaluated the contacts of both Wisconsin and Minnesota, considering as
well the policies underlying the law of each. In contrast to Urhammer,
the court here found significant Wisconsin contacts. Here, the insured
lived in Minnesota but was employed in Wisconsin. The insurance pol-
icy was written and delivered in Wisconsin, premiums were paid there,
and accident reports were made there. The court concluded, "[a]t best
the significant contacts are split between the two states.,
212
If the court were following the Restatement (Second), the logical
conclusion would be to follow the presumptive law provided in Section
188.213 The court instead concluded that the facts presented a true con-
206. See Ud § 188(2).
207. 39 Wis. 2d at 450-51, 159 N.W.2d at 689-90. The court recognized that the accident
took place on a Wisconsin road and that one of the defendants and his insurer are Wisconsin
residents. But these contacts had "nothing to do with the contract question." Id. at 451, 159
N.W.2d at 690.
208. 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
209. Id. at 446, 177 N.W.2d at 330.
210. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6.
211. See supra note 204. The court is now able to cite to the Proposed Official Draft of
the Restatement (Second), rather than to Draft No. 9, as it had previously. Thus, the sec-
tions correspond to the current Restatement. See 47 Wis. 2d at 446 n.6, 177 N.W.2d at 330
n.6.
212. 47 Wis. 2d at 450, 177 N.W.2d at 332.
213. "If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the
same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(3). Application of this presumption might well have led to
Wisconsin law, since the plaintiff alleged in her complaint that at the time the lawsuit was
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flict, requiring application of the five choice-influencing considerations
adopted by the court for tort issues in Heath v. Zellmer.214
The court then, without explanation, ignored the first four consid-
erations: "The only relevant factor here in making our choice of law is
the fifth factor, namely, the 'application of the better rule of law.' ' 215
Wisconsin's rule protecting injured persons was found to be a better
rule than Minnesota's, which protects insurance companies.216 Addi-
tionally, Minnesota had since passed legislation prohibiting family-
exclusion clauses, so that "Minnesota law is now the same as Wiscon-
sin. 2
17
The court thus set forth an unusual choice-of-law analysis for con-
tract issues, relying upon selected Restatement (Second) provisions to
determine whether a true conflict exists. If so, the court then will apply
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, though in the instant case, it
relied solely upon the fifth-better law. In many ways, the court mir-
rors its choice-of-law analysis for tort issues, except that interest analy-
sis determines whether a true conflict exists in tort, and Restatement
(Second) determines whether a true conflict exists in contract. In both
situations, once it finds a true conflict, the court applies Leflar's consid-
erations (or some of them).
VI. OFFICIOUS INTERMEDDLING, INTERLOPING CHAUVINISM AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Two years later, the court revisited its choice-of-law methodology,
again introducing novel elements and modifying its previous analysis.
Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Company218 would appear to be an easy
case. It involved two Ohio employees of an Ohio corporation on a
business trip. Hunker, a passenger in a car driven by his co-employee,
Brown, sued Brown's insurer for injuries he suffered in a two-car acci-
dent on a Wisconsin road. The court had to determine whether Hun-
ker, who had collected an award under Ohio's workers' compensation
law, could sue his co-employee. Ohio's workers' compensation law
commenced, she was living in Wisconsin. One could therefore argue that the contract was
both negotiated and would be performed in Wisconsin. It is likely, though, that when the
contract was "negotiated" in Wisconsin, the insurer anticipated performance in Minnesota,
where the insured then resided. The court did not address this issue.
214. 47 Wis. 2d at 450-51,177 N.W.2d at 332-33.
215. Id. at 451, 177 N.W.2d at 333.
216. Id. at 447-48,451,177 N.W.2d at 331,333.
217. Id. at 451, 177 N.W.2d at 333.
218. 57 Wis. 2d 588,204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
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prohibited such suits. 2 9 Clearly, Ohio law should govern this case.
The court concluded that Ohio law applied, but in the process it
once again modified its choice-of-law. analysis. As in Wilcox, Heath,
and Conklin, Justice Heffernan authored the opinion. The court now
rejected as "inappropriate" the "loose use of language" in prior cases,
which categorized a case as a "true conflict" or not.m The court re-
jected the "two-step technique" employed since Heath as "a redun-
dancy. No useful purpose is served by a preliminary analysis that only
tells us our problem is difficult" (as in Heath, a "true conflict") or
"easy" (as in Wilcox).2" The court instead held that it should first de-
termine whether or not "an outcome-determining conflict" exists,22 that
is, whether "the selection of law will affect the outcome."'m The court
thus discarded both interest analysis (for tort) and Restatement
(Second) (for contract) as a preliminary step to determining whether a
true conflict exists.
If the selection of law will affect the outcome, the next logical step
would be to apply Leflar's five choice-influencing considerations. But
the court instead introduced a new element into its analysis. As noted
above, it first determined
whether there is a conflict, i.e., will the choice of one law as
compared to another determine the outcome. Once that is de-
cided and the facts on their face reveal that to apply any of multi-
ple choices of law would not constitute mere officious intermed-
dling, in the constitutional sense, the analysis should proceed with
the law-selecting process based on the five factors approved in
Heath 4
The court also minimized the forum law presumption. Repeating its
assertion in Conklin that "'the strength of the presumption is irrele-
vant,"' m the court explained, "[t]his court, as an instrument of govern-
mental policy of the state of Wisconsin, is obligated to find the law of its
forum controlling unless it can be demonstrated that the law derived
from another jurisdiction is more appropriate."'  Furthermore,
219. Id at 591-92, 204 N.W.2d at 898-99.
220. I at 597, 204 N.W.2d at 901-902.
221. Id at 597-98, 204 N.W.2d at 902.
222. Id at 597, 204 N.W.2d at 902.
223. Id. at 596, 204 N.W.2d at 901.
224. Id. at 598, 204 N.W.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 599, 204 N.W.2d at 902 (quoting Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 475 n.2,
157 N.W.2d 579,582 n.2 (1968).
226. 57 Wis. 2d at 599,204 N.W.2d at 903.
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"[w]hile it may be difficult to dispel innate parochial preference, the
resolution of a conflict ought not be skewed by a forum preference."
'm
If, after applying the choice-influencing considerations, the court did
not find "that the foreign law is appropriate, the conflict should be re-
solved by the application of forum law.' ' 2m This is a far cry from the
strong forum preference seen in earlier cases where forum law pre-
sumably applied unless it would clearly constitute "interloping chau-
vinism.",
229
But what can one make of the new references to "mere officious in-
termeddling, in the constitutional sense"? How does one decide if the
"facts on their face reveal" that application of the law of one state or
another might constitute such intermeddling? The court offered no an-
swer.
A legal definition of "intermeddling" is "[t]o interfere wrongly with
property or the conduct of business affairs officiously or without right
or title." ' In tort law, an "officious intermeddler" refers to a rescuer, a
volunteer who "officiously confers a benefit upon another" and is there-
fore "not entitled to restitution therefor."2' Both definitions allude to
one's unwarranted interference in the affairs of another. "In the consti-
tutional sense" can only mean that the court must ensure that a state
has adequate contacts with a case (judging by the "facts on their face")
so that application of its law would not be unconstitutional.
Clearly, a court cannot engage in unconstitutional choice-of-law
analysis. The court in Hunker now appeared to focus on this obvious
conclusion and, at the same time, to eliminate Currie's interest analysis
from its choice-of-law methodology. Rather than focus on the policies
underlying each interested state's law and asking whether that interest
will be furthered by application of that state's law, we are now to focus
instead on the competing laws (to determine whether they are outcome-
determinative) and on the facts (to guard against an unconstitutional
choice of law).
The constitutional question presumably should be answered by ref-
erence to well-established United States Supreme Court decisions.
These decisions focus primarily on both the due process and equal
227. Id. at 600,204 N.W.2d at 903.
228. Id.
229. See Conklin, 38 Wis. 2d at 475 n.2, 157 N.W.2d at 582 n.2.
230. BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990).
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 2.
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protection clauses. Beginning with Home Insurance Co. v. Dicke 2 and
culminating in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague3 and Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts,' the United States Supreme Court has established consti-
tutional limits on choice of law. In Hague, the Court noted that it "has
taken a similar approach in deciding choice-of-law cases under both the
Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause."235 Under
both clauses, the Court examines "the contacts of the State, whose law
was applied, with the parties and with the occurrence or transaction
giving rise to the litigation."36 The Court will invalidate "the choice of
law of a State which has had no significant contact or significant aggre-
gation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the oc-
currence or transaction."2 37 But if the state whose law is applied has "a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamen-
tally unfair," 238 the Court will uphold the choice-of-law decision.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts? 9 the Court recognized that the
forum may be most inclined to apply its own law. But the due process
and full faith and credit clauses provide at least "modest restrictions on
the application of forum law." 240 Thus, before a Wisconsin court applies
its own law or the law of another state, it must first find that that state
has a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts with the
parties and the subject matter. To do otherwise would not only be un-
constitutional, but would constitute "mere officious intermeddling, in
the constitutional sense."' 1
In Hunker,24 2 although the court failed to conduct a careful constitu-
tional analysis, it is clear that constitutional restraints posed no real
problem in the application of Ohio law. Two employees of an Ohio
corporation were involved, both of them covered by Ohio workers'
compensation law, and a workers' compensation award had already
been made under that law. The court could easily find that Ohio had
232. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
233. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
234. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
235. Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 n.10.
236. Id. at 308.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 313.
239. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
240. Id- at 818.
241. See Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 598, 204 N.W.2d 897, 902
(1973).
242. IaL at 588, 204 N.W.2d at 897.
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significant contacts with the case. Application of Wisconsin law might
have posed greater constitutional danger.
It is unclear why the court chose to introduce constitutional con-
cerns in this choice-of-law case. Although "[t]he Full Faith and Credit,
Due Process, Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and Com-
merce Clauses all can easily be read to protect nonforum state interests,
or the interest of nonforum litigants, that are disrupted by parochial
state conflicts decisions..., the Supreme Court rarely intervenes under
the Constitution to protect these interests. For choice of law, ours is a
forgiving Constitution."2 43
In Hunker, after its brief mention of "mere officious intermeddling,
in the constitutional sense, ' 24 the court applied Leflar's five choice-
influencing considerations as it has done in prior cases. It acknowl-
edged that the predictability factor plays a role even in cases involving
unintentional conduct. Although this factor may have been misapplied
in earlier cases, the court now noted that "the question is not whether
parties plan to commit [a tort] but whether ... the result, i.e., the legal
consequence of the unintended act, comports with the predictions or
expectations of the parties."2 45 In this case, the court believed the par-
ties would have expected Ohio law to govern.26
The court found that the second consideration, maintenance of in-
terstate and international order, which "'requires that a state that is
minimally concerned defer to the interests of a state that is substantially
concerned,"' 24 is of minimal importance. Although application of Wis-
consin law would not be absurd or unconstitutional or lead to retalia-
tion,' s Ohio's interest far outweighed Wisconsin's interest.249
The third factor, simplification of the judicial task, had no signifi-
cance here. "The application of Ohio law would not complicate the
task of Wisconsin judges." It would simply mean that the Wisconsin
court would proceed no further.2'
243. Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. LJ. 271,
271 (1996).
244. 57 Wis. 2d at 598,204 N.W.2d at 902.
245. Id. at 600, 204 N.W.2d at 903.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 601,204 N.W.2d at 903-04 (quoting Conklin, 38 Wis. 2d 468,479, 157 N.W.2d
574,584 (1968)).
248. 57 Wis. 2d at 601,204 N.W.2d at 904.
249. Id. at 602,204 N.W.2d at 904.
250. Id. at 603,204 N.W.2d at 904.
251. Id at 603,204 N.W.2d at 904.
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The court next considered the forum's interests, which included the
"admonitory and deterrent effect of tort liability," but focused primarily
on compensating those who are injured . 2 Here, the victim had been
compensated and his medical creditors reimbursed, under Ohio's work-
ers' compensation scheme, leaving Wisconsin with no "serious govern-
mental interest." 3
Finally, the court turned its attention to the better law considera-
tion, concluding that Ohio's law is reasonable and may, in fact, be part
of a trend toward barring suits against co-employees. "We cannot say
Wisconsin's law, under these facts, is the better law."2 The court ap-
plied Ohio's law.
Hunker represents the last time the Wisconsin Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify its choice-of-law analysis. During the next twenty-
four years and up to the present time, the court attempted merely to
apply its analysis. And the novel Hunker court reference to "officious
intermeddling" failed to reappear in supreme court decisions, although
it can frequently be found in lower court decisions, as demonstrated
below.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided few cases since Hunker
which specifically address choice of law.
In Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.,25 de-
cided the same year as Hunker, the Supreme Court focused on only two
of the five considerations. And in Slawek v. Stroh,' decided less than a
year after Hunker, the court gave cursory (and inconsistent) attention
to its choice of law analysis. In a case involving the tort of seduction,
the court followed what it termed the "grouping of significant contacts"
test coupled with a strong forum presumption. Inasmuch as the laws of
two other states were repugnant to Wisconsin law, Wisconsin had sig-
nificant contacts with the tort, and Wisconsin had a strong interest, the
court concluded that "the law of Wisconsin is the better choice and ap-
plies." 7 The court failed to mention constitutional concerns, nor did it
give close attention to any of the Leflar factors. It focused primarily on
Wisconsin's strong connection with the tort: the father-seducer chose
the Wisconsin forum, the mother-seducee now lives in Wisconsin, and
252. Id. at 604-605,204 N.W.2d at 905.
253. Id at 606, 204 N.W.2d at 906.
254. Id. at 610,204 N.W.2d at 908.
255. 58 Wis. 2d 193,206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
256. 62 Wis. 2d 295,215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
257. Id. at 313,215 N.W.2d at 19.
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the product of the seduction-the child-is a resident of Wisconsin."8
The court adhered more closely to its Hunker analysis in Lichter v.
Fritsch,29 decided a few years later. The case arose from an accident in-
volving a stolen vehicle. Under Wisconsin law the car's owner would
not be liable to third parties for injury caused by the thief. But under
Illinois law, "the owner who leaves his keys in the unattended vehicle
[as here] may be liable to the injured third parties depending upon
where he left the car."2 °
The court determined that the choice of one law as compared to an-
other would be outcome determinative, thus requiring an analysis of the
five choice-influencing considerations." By conducting a thoughtful
application of the considerations, the court concluded that Illinois law
should be applied, even though application of Wisconsin law would
simplify the court's task and despite the court's conclusion that Wiscon-
sin law represented the majority view. Illinois law would provide com-
pensation to the injured defendant, an interest which "is consistent with
the policy and theory of Wisconsin law to compensate the victim." 2 2
The court gave no attention either to forum law presumption nor to
constitutional concerns (officious intermeddling).
That same year, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Handal v.
American Farmers Mutual Casualty Co., a case involving insurance
contract interpretation. The court, relying on Haines v. Mid-Century
Insurance Co.,2" another insurance contract case, noted that Wisconsin
follows the "grouping of contacts rule" for contract cases, which in-
volves analysis under the Restatement (Second).2 Although the court
reached the correct conclusion that Iowa law should govern this dispute
involving an Iowa insured and a car garaged in Iowa, it gave little atten-
tion to analysis, citing only section 188 of the Restatement (Second). "
And, unlike its analysis in Haines,2 7 the court made no mention of the
258. 1&
259. 77 Wis. 2d 178,252 N.W.2d 360 (1977).
260. Id at 182-83,252 N.W.2d at 362. The defendant here left his vehicle in the parking
lot of an institution for the mentally ill. A patient stole the car, drove to Wisconsin, and in-
jured a third party. Id. at 179,252 N.W.2d at 361.
261. Id at 182-83, 252 N.W.2d at 363.
262. Id at 186,252 N.W.2d at 364.
263. 79 Wis. 2d 67,255 N.W.2d 903 (1977).
264. 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
265. 79 Wis. 2d at 73, 255 N.W.2d at 906.
266. See id. at 74 n.2, 255 N.W.2d at 906 n.2. The court failed to apply Section 6 or Sec-
tion 193.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 208-17.
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choice-influencing considerations.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's most recent decision involving
choice of law was Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp..' another contract
case. In an opinion which can only create confusion, the court asserted
that it follows the "grouping of contacts" test for contract cases: "By
this method the law of the state with which the contract has its most
significant relationship applies." 9  The court cited the Restatement
(Second). It continued: "In Haines... this court.., cited five factors
generally considered by the court in making choice of law determina-
tions." 2°0 The court then ignored Restatement analysis entirely, instead
relying upon the five choice-influencing considerations, plus an implied
forum law preference," to conclude that Wisconsin law should be ap-
plied.
VII. CURRENT STATE OF WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of Wisconsin
Supreme Court choice-of-law decisions. First, choice-of-law decisions
in this state have traveled a very bumpy road. The court's desire for a
"practical and workable" approach 2 which will serve as "a guide to the
future to provide a uniform common law of conflicts" has not yet been
achieved.
Second, it seems clear that in tort cases, the court must first deter-
mine whether the selection of one state's law over another state's law
will affect the outcome. Obviously, if the outcome will not be affected,
there is no relevant conflict of laws. In that instance, it is convenient
and efficient to apply forum law. But if the selection is outcome deter-
minative, the court will apply Leflar's five choice-influencing considera-
tions. The court has not, however, applied the considerations consis-
tently.
Third, the court has cautioned against "interloping chauvinism, ' m
an "innate parochial preference" for forum law.24 Leflar's theory, of
course, includes advancement of the forum's governmental interest as
268. 86 Wis. 2d 226,271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
269. Id. at 239,271 N.W.2d at 885.
270. Id. at 239-40, 271 N.W.2d at 885-86.
271. "We observe finally that the defendant has simply not shown any persuasive rea-
son to displace the law of the forum." Id. at 241,271 N.W.2d at 886.
272. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
273. See Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468 n.2, 157 N.W.2d 579,582 n.2 (1968).
274. See Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 600, 204 N.W.2d 897, 903
(1973).
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one legitimate consideration, but he also noted that the interests must
be thoughtfully and intelligently identified. The policies underlying
competing rules must be carefully examined to see if those policies bear
a sufficient relationship to the case's factual contacts. A court should
weigh this consideration in favor of forum law only if, after careful
analysis, the court finds that the forum has a governmental interest
which would be effectuated by application of its law. In addition, all of
the four other choice-influencing considerations must also be examined.
And fourth, the court favors compensation for tort victims. In six of
the seven primary cases involving conflict of laws issues,2 the court
ruled in favor of the law which would allow compensation. In the sev-
enth case 6 it did not; however, the victim there had already received a
workers' compensation recovery, and the court refused to permit dou-
ble recovery.2" The court has not been reticent in admitting that Wis-
consin's governmental interest includes compensating injured victims,
resident and non-resident alike. 8
What is not clear about the Wisconsin court's choice of law analysis
relates to two separate issues: 1) the constitutional principles underly-
ing choice-of-law decisions and 2) its treatment of contract cases.
The only reference to constitutional concerns is found in Hunker,
and then in the court's cryptic language of "officious intermeddling."
The court's cursory reference in Hunker does not suggest that a rigor-
ous examination of "officious intermeddling" is necessary in subsequent
cases. But as the United States Supreme Court has made clear, consti-
tutional concerns may be raised any time the court seeks to apply the
law of a state which lacks contacts with or an interest in the caseY9 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court should eliminate "officious intermeddling"
language and replace it with clearly defined constitutional analysis, as
set forth in United States Supreme Court constitutional decisions.'
275. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Heath v. Zellmer, 35
Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156
N.W.2d 466 (1968); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Slawek v.
Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974); Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d
360 (1977).
276. See Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588,204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
277. See id. at 606,204 N.W.2d at 906.
278. See, e.g., Heath, 35 Wis. 2d at 592, 599-601,151 N.W.2d at 670, 674-75; Zelinger, 38
Wis. 2d at 112, 156 N.W.2d at 472; Conklin, 38 Wis. 2d at 477,157 N.W.2d at 583; Hunker, 57
Wis. 2d at 604-05,204 N.W.2d at 905; Lichter, 77 Wis. 2d at 186,252 N.W.2d at 364.
279. See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
280. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), Allstate Ins. Co. v.
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In its treatment of contract issues, the court professes to follow the
most significant relationship test, embodied in the Restatement
(Second)."' Instead it applies a vague "grouping of contacts" test,m or
selected sections of the Restatement (Second),2 or Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations,' or a combination of the last two."
VIII. WISCONSIN'S COURTS OF APPEAL AND CHOICE OF LAW
ANALYSIS
Perhaps the best test to determine whether the court's choice of law
analysis has given adequate guidance to the bench and bar is to examine
choice of law decisions made by lower court judges since the highest
court's last word on choice of law.
A. Tort
In the area of tort, the supreme court cases would suggest a uniform,
predictable, workable choice of law analysis. First, determine whether
the selection of one state's law over another state's law will affect the
outcome. If not, there is no relevant conflict of laws. If so, apply Le-
flar's five choice-influencing considerations. The court of appeals has
applied this analysis in several cases."
But more frequently (and in ways clearly out of step with United
States Supreme Court constitutional choice-of-law analysis),' the lower
court quickly concludes its inquiry with a determination that the law of
only one jurisdiction could be applied; application of any other law
would constitute officious intermeddling.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
281. See Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226,271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
282. See Urhammer v. Olson, 39 Wis. 2d 447, 159 N.W.2d 688 (1968).
283. See Handal v. American Farmers Mut. Cas. Co., 79 Wis. 2d 67, 255 N.W.2d 903
(1977).
284. See Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226,271 N.W.2d 879 (1978).
285. See Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
286. See Schlussler v. Amer. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 157 Wis. 2d 516,460 N.W.2d 756 (Ct.
App. 1990); Edward E. Gillen Co. v. Valders Stone and Marble, 1990 WL 262093 (Ct. App.
Dec. 26, 1990); Pitts v. Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co., 1981 WL 139103 (Ct. App. Dec. 21,
1981). In Marsh v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins., 179 Wis. 2d 42, 505 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App.
1993), the court did not reach choice-of-law issues, basing its holding instead on a lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. However, the dissent would have found jurisdiction and noted that tort
issues should be decided by application of the choice-influencing considerations. l at 61,
505 N.W.2d at 169 (Cane, P.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 232-41.
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Thus, in American Standard Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, the court
held that application of Minnesota law would constitute officious inter-
meddling, where Minnesota had only "a minimal interest."2' 9 The Wis-
consin plaintiff and Wisconsin defendant were involved in an automo-
bile accident case in Minnesota. Under Minnesota's no-fault law, "a
plaintiff cannot recover from a tortfeasor for benefits paid by his own
insurer .... Also, the plaintiff's insurer generally has no subrogation
right to recover from the tortfeasor for benefits paid to the plaintiff."
But in Wisconsin, "a plaintiff may recover from a tortfeasor for dam-
ages paid by the plaintiff's insurer unless the insurer has a contractual
subrogation right to recover such amounts." In any event, "the tortfea-
sor is liable under Wisconsin law to either the plaintiff or his insurer for
amounts paid by collateral sources."2'
The court agreed that Minnesota had an interest in promoting high-
way safety, but that interest was unrelated to the "economic and social
consequences of the tortious conduct"29' involving the two Wisconsin
residents. Yet the court acknowledged that Minnesota's interest was
implicated. "Wisconsin's collateral source rule is intended to deter
negligent conduct by placing the full cost of the wrongful conduct on the
tortfeasor. Application of Wisconsin's law actually promotes Minne-
sota's interest in assuring highway safety."2 2
Once the court finds that application of Minnesota law would consti-
tute officious intermeddling, its task is completed. Nevertheless, this
court inexplicably conducted a brief analysis of Leflar's five choice-
influencing considerations. Again it acknowledged Minnesota's inter-
est. It admitted that the "[m]aintainance of interstate order is not im-
plicated by the application of either state's law because neither choice
would be totally unreasonable."'2 But Wisconsin's compensation inter-
est, combined with the court's clear conviction that Wisconsin's law is
better, leads to the court's predictable conclusion that Wisconsin law
applies.
A finding of officious intermeddling in subsequent cases terminates
the court's inquiry more quickly. For example, in three slip and fall
cases, all of them occurring outside Wisconsin, the court quickly finds
that an application of Wisconsin law would constitute officious inter-
288. 124 Wis. 2d 258,369 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1985).
289. Id. at 264,369 N.W.2d at 172.
290. Id at 261,369 N.W.2d at 170-71.
291. Id at 264,369 N.W.2d at 172.
292. Id at 264,369 N.W.2d at 172 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
293. Id at 265,369 N.W.2d at 172.
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meddling, even though all of them involved injury to a Wisconsin resi-
dent.294 In all three cases, Wisconsin law offered more protection than
foreign law.295 Gone now is any mention of Wisconsin's interest in com-
pensating victims, even its own residents. Although the court in each
case might well have arrived at the conclusion that foreign law should
apply, given its concern for the owners of real property in other states, a
finding that Wisconsin has no constitutionally adequate interest is sim-
ply inconsistent with its prior decisions and with United States Supreme
Court decisions.296
A recent court of appeals case demonstrates an additional problem.
In Sharp v. Case Corp.,29 the court of appeals attempted to apply the
choice-influencing considerations to a tort case, but focused only on the
forum's interest in providing "full compensation to persons who are in-
jured by negligent conduct and to deter such conduct .... ,29B The court
relied heavily on a "presumption that the forum law applies." 29 None
of the considerations received attention.
B. Contract
Cases involving contract choice-of-law issues also demonstrate
lower court confusion. The court at times applies Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations,3°° the Restatement (Second), a combination
of both, or an alternative.
Two contract cases, both decided in 1984, demonstrate differing
294. See Scott v. Pilot Corp., 1996 WL 588038 (Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1996) (slip and fall by
Wisconsin resident in Illinois gas station) (this opinion arose from a District I panel, but the
state's highest court has made it clear that the appellate court is a "unitary" court and func-
tions "as a single court administered by a single chief judge .... The published decision of
any one of the panels has binding effect on all panels of the Court." In re Court of Appeals,
82 Wis. 2d 369, 370-71, 263 N.W.2d 149, 149-50 (1978)); Johnson v. The Travelers Ins. Co.,
1992 WL 142249 (Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1992) (slip and fall by Wisconsin resident at Illinois mo-
tel); Burns v. Geres, 140 Wis. 2d 197, 409 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1987) (slip and fall by Wis-
consin resident at the Frank Lloyd Wright School of Architecture in Arizona).
295. In both Johnson and Burns, the court noted that Wisconsin's safe place statute,
Wis. Stats. sec. 101.11, requires a higher standard of care than Illinois' and Arizona's stan-
dards of ordinary care. Johnson, 1992 WL 142249, at ***2; Burns, 140 Wis. 2d at 200-01, 409
N.W.2d at 430. In Scott, although the court did not specifically discuss the conflicting rules, it
affirmed the trial court's decision that, under Illinois law, the gas station had breached no
duty. 1996 WL 588038, at ***1 - ***2.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 232-41.
297. 1997 WL 757498 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1997).
298. M at *2.
299. Id.
300. Wisconsin cases rarely mention Robert Leflar as the creator of its choice of law
analysis. Instead, courts refer only to the five choice-influencing considerations.
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methodologies. In Gavers v. Federal Life Insurance Co.,301 the court had
to determine whether California or Wisconsin law governed a life insur-
ance policy presumption-of-death question, when a Wisconsin insured
left the state, arrived in California, and was never heard from again.
California law required that "a diligent effort be made to locate the ab-
sentee before the presumption [of death] can apply."'  Wisconsin had
no similar requirement.
The court began its analysis with the methodology usually reserved
for tort choice-of-law questions. It would first determine "whether a
genuine conflict exists. If so, an application of the choice-influencing
considerations should proceed unless it is decided that application of
any of the multiple choices of law would constitute mere 'officious in-
termeddling."' Despite the evidence that the absentee arrived in Cali-
fornia and may have disappeared there, the court held that application
of California law would constitute officious intermeddling.'
Two months later, the court of appeals applied a different choice-of-
law analysis. In Ziemba v. Anagnos, 5 the court had to decide whether
Wisconsin's motor vehicle repair law controlled a conflict between an
Illinois auto repairman and a Wisconsin car owner. Illinois had no spe-
cific motor vehicle repair law, but under Wisconsin law, "there can be
no valid contract for auto repairs following a face-to-face meeting un-
less a choice of written estimate alternatives is given to a customer be-
fore any repair is commenced. '"3 When the Wisconsin resident took his
car to the Illinois garage for repairs, he was not provided with a choice
of written estimate alternatives.
In finding that Wisconsin law applied to the Illinois repair shop, the
court first followed the Restatement (Second) or most significant rela-
tionship test. But the court concluded "that the significant contacts,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, fail to favor one state over an-
other."30' The court then "turn[ed] to an additional analysis referred to
as the 'choice-influencing analysis,"' and purported to apply Leflar's
five factors, arriving at the questionable conclusion that Wisconsin law
301. 118 Wis. 2d 113,345 N.W.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1984).
302. Ik at 118, 345 N.W.2d at 902 (citations omitted).
303. L at 115-16, 345 N.W.2d at 901-02 (citation omitted).
304. Id at 118,345 N.W.2d at 903.
305. 1984 WL 180669 (Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1984).
306. Id at ***1.
307. Id at ***5.
308. Id.
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applies3 O The court thus followed the analysis set forth in Haines v.
Mid-Century Insurance Co.," ° which involved both the Restatement
(Second) and Leflar's choice-influencing considerations.
Subsequent contract cases reflect a variety of approaches as well.
The court in Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3 '
returned to the Haines analysis: "Contract rights are to be determined
by the local law of the state with which the contract has its most signifi-
cant relationship. 31 2  But when "each of the two jurisdictions has
'relatively equally significant contacts,""3 3 then "[a]dditional guides for
the court in making the choice of law determination are the 'choice-
influencing considerations.,'3 14 But the court found it had no need to
rely on "additional guides," because Michigan contacts predominated
under sections 188 and 193 of the Restatement (Second).3"5
Two weeks later, the court of appeals decided American Standard
Insurance Co. v. Cleveland,"6 which involved both tort and contract
choice-of-law issues.317 After deciding that Wisconsin law would apply
309. The court misapplied Leflar's analysis primarily by focusing only on the substan-
tive aspects of Wisconsin's motor vehicle repair law. It did not consider general choice-of-
law principles and ignored Illinois substantive law altogether. For example, the court claimed
that "[t]he predictability criterion definitely favors Wisconsin law," because a written con-
tract, as required by Wisconsin law, better informs the parties of the terms of their agree-
ment. Id. The court thus focuses, not on the parties' reliance on one body of law over an-
other as Leflar envisioned, but on the substantive law itself.
The court next correctly articulated the second factor: maintenance of interstate and in-
ternational order. But then seemingly disregarding the fact that this case involved an Illinois
repairman in an Illinois repair shop, the court asserted that Illinois ought to "welcome" Wis-
consin's requirement for written estimate alternatives, since "[t]he more written estimate
alternatives given, the less likely are disputes concerning alleged unauthorized repairs." Id.
at ***6.
Simplification of the judicial task is also served by application of Wisconsin law, the
court asserted, because a written agreement is easier to enforce. The court made no mention
of whether Illinois or Wisconsin law generally would facilitate a resolution in this case.
It is thus no surprise that the Wisconsin court found that the last two factors-
advancement of the forum's governmental interests and application of the better law-
favored Wisconsin law.
310. 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970). See supra text accompanying notes 209-17.
311. 1985 WL 188035 (Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1985).
312. Id. at ***4.
313. Id. (quoting Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 450-51, 177 N.W.2d
328, 332-33 (1970)).
314. 1985 WL 188035, at ***4.
315. Id., 368 N.W.2d at 847 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS §§
188, 193).
316. 124 Wis. 2d 258,369 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1985).
317. The tort issue is discussed supra text accompanying notes 288-93.
WISCONSIN'S CHOICE OF LAW
to the tort issue, the court turned to the contract issue: "Contract rights
are determined by the law of the state with which the contract has its
most significant relationship., 31" Because everything having to do with
the automobile insurance policy occurred in Wisconsin 319 and both par-
ties were from Wisconsin, the court predictably applied Wisconsin
law.320
Several subsequent court of appeals decisions relied solely upon the
Restatement (Second) in resolving contract choice of law issues.321
Some cases make no mention of the Restatement (Second), instead re-
ferring only to the "grouping-of-contacts" or "most significant contacts"
theory3 2 Some relied solely upon Leflar's choice-influencing consid-
erations." And in one case, the court asserted: "Wisconsin uses a
'groupings of contacts' test to determine choice of law .... Under that
doctrine, the choice of law is based on [Leflar's choice influencing con-
siderations]."'324 The court thereby merges the two tests, focusing only
on Leflar's analysis which it incorrectly designates the "groupings of
contacts" test. The Restatement (Second) vanishes.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court had hoped for a "practical
and workable" approach3 which would serve as "a guide to the future
to provide a uniform common law of conflicts,"3 6 lower court decisions
demonstrate that this vision has not yet been achieved.
IX. FEDERAL COURTS' APPLICATION OF WISCONSIN CHOICE OF LAW
ANALYSIS
It is well accepted that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
the substantive law of the forum state,32 including that state's choice of
318. 124 Wis. 2d at 267,369 N.W.2d at 173.
319. The only foreign element in this case is that the accident occurred in Minnesota.
320. 124 Wis. 2d at 267,369 N.W.2d at 173.
321. See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Klein & Son, Inc., 157 Wis. 2d 552,460 N.W.2d 763
(Ct. App. 1990); Berington v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 1996 WL 363560 (Ct. App. July
2,1996).
322. See, e.g., American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 169 Wis. 2d 605, 609, 486
N.W.2d 537, 538 (Ct. App. 1992); Belland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 391, 397-98, 410
N.W.2d 611,613-14 (Ct. App. 1987) ("most significant relationship").
323. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Pelczynski, 153 Wis. 2d 303,309, 451 N.W.2d
300,302 (Ct. App. 1989); Wyss v. Albee, 183 Wis. 2d 245,263,515 N.W.2d 517, 524 (Ct. App.
1994).
324. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 202 Wis.
2d 673,691,552 N.W.2d 420,427 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).
325. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 621,133 N.W.2d 408,410 (1965).
326. Id. at 635, 133 N.W.2d at 417.
327. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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law rules.3 Thus, a federal court sitting in Wisconsin must apply Wis-
consin choice of law methodology. Federal decisions therefore reveal
the federal judiciary's interpretation of Wisconsin's choice of law meth-
odology.
For example, as early as 1968, the Eastern District Court of Wiscon-
sin noted that Wisconsin had become "a leader in adopting the rela-
tively new 'center of gravity' approach to conflict problems."'329 As de-
fined by the court, this approach involved an initial determination as to
whether two or more states have strong policies which would be fur-
thered by their application. If so, the court will apply Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations.
Ten years later, another federal court, this one in Michigan,3' was
called upon to interpret Wisconsin choice of law analysis. By now, Wis-
consin's analysis had become a melting pot of methodologies, and this
court's opinion reflects that confusion:
Wisconsin first adopted a two-tiered analysis which began with a
combination of "significant contacts" and "interest analysis"
theories and then proceeded to "qualitative analysis," beginning
with a "weak presumption" in favor of lex fori and guided by
Professor Robert Leflar's five choice-influencing factors....
In Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recognized that this method of analysis was a
"redundancy.'33
Thus, after Hunker, the court would first determine 1) whether an out-
come-determinative conflict exists; and 2) if so, whether application of
any of the state's laws would "constitute mere officious intermeddling,
in the constitutional sense. 332 If neither law would constitute officious
328. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
329. Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533, 535 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (citing Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965)); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151
N.W.2d 664 (1967); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466
(1968); Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Urhammer v. Olson, 39
Wis. 2d 447, 159 N.W.2d 688 (1968)). See also Snow v. Continental Products Corp., 353 F.
Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Decker v. Fox River Tractor, 324 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
330. Reminga v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Mich. 1978). This case arose
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 et seq. The United Supreme Court in
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1962), held that federal courts adjudicating claims
under the F.T.C.A. must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state where the act or omission
occurred, rather than the rules of the state in which the court sits, as is the usual practice un-
der Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
331. 448 F. Supp. at 457 (citations omitted).
332. Id. (quoting Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 598, 204 N.W.2d 897,
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intermeddling, the analysis would then turn to Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations, according to the district court.33
The court in one federal case ignored Wisconsin's "officious inter-
meddling" language and instead, without explanation, focused on
choice-of-law constitutionality as defined by the United States Supreme
Court.3 And the court in another case articulated the Wisconsin choice
of law methodology for contract cases, as it perceived it: the grouping
of contacts approach as reflected in the Restatement (Second) sections
188, 6, and others relating to contract disputes.335 Another asserted that
in tort cases, Wisconsin follows the "center of gravity" or "grouping of
contacts" test and equated those tests with Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations.336
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also been drawn into
Wisconsin's choice of law arena."' The most informative of these cases
is Diesel Service Co. v. Ambac International Corp.,338 a fairly recent case
in which the court applied its best guess as to Wisconsin choice of law
analysis for contract cases.339 The court asserted that Wisconsin courts
apply the Restatement (Second) most significant contacts test.'
However, the Seventh Circuit also recognized the state court's con-
fusion in such application. Although Wisconsin courts place reliance on
section 188 of the Restatement (Second), 1 they tend to ignore other
902 (1973)).
333. l&
334. See Grabski v. Finn, 630 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (E.D. Wis. 1986) ("While it would not
offend due process to apply either state's laws to this issue, see Allstate Insurance Company
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302... (1940), the Michigan contacts are more significant.")
335 See CSS-Wisconsin Office v. Houston Satellite Systems, 779 F. Supp. 979, 984 (E.D.
1991).
336. See Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 740, 767 (E.D.
Wis. 1994).
337. See, e.g., Hystro Products, Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1387 (7th Cir. 1994)
("In contract cases, Wisconsin courts apply the law of the state with which the contract has
the most significant relationship"); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985) (court
agrees that lower court properly applied Wisconsin choice of law analysis; it determined
whether an outcome determinative conflict existed and applied Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations).
338. 961 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992).
339. The case was brought under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, Wis. Stat. §
135.01 et seq. (1996). The court treats the disputed issue as one of contract, although it rec-
ognizes the characterization problem which exists: "While this is not a breach of contract
case, neither is it a tort case; anyway, the factors are similar." 961 F.2d at 639 n.4.
340. 961 F.2d at 639.40 (citing Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177
N.W.2d 328 (1970)).
341. Section 188 provides that the "rights and duties of the parties with respect to an
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Restatement sections, including the choice-of-law principles set forth in
section 6.12 Instead, according to the court, "when the significant con-
tacts from § 188 were split between two states," 34 Wisconsin courts turn
to the choice-influencing factors relied upon in tort cases, rather than to
Restatement (Second) section 6.4' And this is what the district court in
Diesel Service Company had done, noting the similarity between Le-
flar's factors and section 6 of the Restatement (Second). 45 The Seventh
Circuit followed the same analysis.
But two cases decided in 1997 take a different-and better-
approach. In Kuehn v. Children's Hospital, Los Angeles,3 a tort case,
the Seventh Circuit carefully and thoroughly conducted a straightfor-
ward application of all five of Leflar's choice-influencing considera-
tions.47 The court made no mention of "officious intermeddling." In
issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which.., has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OF LAWS § 188(1).
The second part of § 188 lists "the contacts to be taken into account in applying the prin-
ciples of § 6." They include place of contracting, negotiation, and performance; location of
the contract's subject matter; and the parties' domicile, residence, nationality, place of incor-
poration and place of business. Id. at § 188(2). When the place of negotiation and place of
performance are in the same state, the law of that state applies, ld at § 188(3).
342. "[I]n practice Wisconsin courts do not seem to have relied upon these [§ 6] fac-
tors." 961 F.2d at 640.
Restatement (Second) § 6 sets forth general choice-of-law principles. "[Factors rele-
vant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include"
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6(2).
343. 961 F.2d at 640.
344. It.
345. Lefiar's factors are:
Predictability of results;
Maintenance of interstate and international order;
Simplification of the judicial task;
Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
Application of the better rule of law.
See Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 596, 151 N.W.2d 664, 672 (1967). Section 6 of the Re-
statement (Second) is set forth at supra note 342.
346. 119 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir. 1997).
347. See id. at 1300-1303. Chief Judge Posner considers the choice-of-law issue
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reversing the district court, the court applied Wisconsin law.'
In Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co., -9 a contract case de-
cided the same year, the Seventh Circuit relied solely on Restatement
(Second)."' The court, however, failed to consider Section 6, focusing
almost exclusively on Section 188 of the Restatement. 5'
In summary, federal courts have reached different conclusions about
Wisconsin's choice of law analysis. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
would greatly assist the state's lower courts, federal courts, and the
practicing bar by adopting a clear, workable choice of law methodology.
X. A UNIFORM, PRACTICAL AND WORKABLE APPROACH
Designing a practical and workable common law"35 approach to
choice of law can be daunting, as witnessed in the various approaches
taken by Wisconsin courts over the past thirty years. It is clear that at-
tempting to combine two or more approaches in any one case can lead
only to confusion. Judges need an approach that is as simple as possible
yet provides adequate guidelines. Lawyers require predictability in the
sense that they should be able to determine which state's law the court
is most likely to apply in any given set of facts. As it now stands, law-
yers are not even able to predict the methodology which a court will
follow, much less the result.
The Restatement (Second) has not well served Wisconsin courts. It
inevitably involves application of at least three separate Restatement
sections: the general choice of law principles, 353 the presumptive appli-
cable rule,3 and the relevant contacts for the specific area of law. 55 If a
"complicated," because "Wisconsin uses a laundry-list approach to conflicts questions." lIL
at 1300.
348. Id. at 1303.
349. 107 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 1997).
350. See Ud at 1255.
351. See icL at 1255-56. But see id. at 1256 n.5, in which the court refers to § 193 as the
presumptive rule for insurance contracts.
352. Some scholars have suggested that federal choice of law statutes might resolve
much uncertainty. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-of-Law Statutes, 44 TENN. L. REV. 951
(1977). One state-Louisiana-recently adopted a broad Conflict of Laws code. See LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3515-3556 (1997). Most states have adopted statutes for particular
choice of law issues. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 632.09 (insurance contracts), 853.05 (wills),
893.07 (statute of limitation) (1997). Statutory choice of law will be the subject of a subse-
quent article.
353. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6.
354. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 146 (place of injury
for personal injury), § 169 (place of domicile for intra-family immunity), § 175 (place of in-
jury for wrongful death), § 188 (place of negotiating and performing a contract if the same), §
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
court carefully considers each of these applicable Restatement sections,
it is possible to arrive at a reasonable, justifiable choice of law. But
thirty years of Wisconsin jurisprudence have demonstrated that courts
are unwilling to wade through the Restatement (Second) and instead
focus on one or another of its provisions in a way which adds to the
choice-of-law confusion and unpredictability.
Although at least twenty other states employ the Restatement
(Second), they have done so with no more success than Wisconsin.
Scholars have long criticized the Restatement (Second), generally be-
cause it attempts to incorporate traditional analysis (in its presumptive
rules), interest analysis, plus a plethora of factors and contacts for
courts to consider. "Trying to be all things to all people, it produced
mush." '356 Professor Larry Kramer, a renowned conflicts scholar, writes:
"... it hardly comes as news that the Second Restatement is flawed. But
one needs to read a lot of opinions in a single sitting fully to appreciate
just how badly the Second Restatement works in practice."'
Furthermore, the Second Restatement poses problems of charac-
terization. Chapter 7 offers principles and presumptive rules for tort,
chapter 8 for contracts, chapter 9 for property 58 Before the court can
even begin to apply the appropriate sections, it must characterize each
issue as tort or contract or property, presenting the same opportunities
for manipulation or mistake demonstrated under the first Restate-
ment.
359
But where the Second Restatement fails to provide a solution be-
cause of its over-reaching complexity, Leflar's choice-influencing meth-
odology offers the distinct advantage of simplicity. Five factors com-
prise the entire analysis.
Although this analysis has not achieved the popularity of the Second
Restatement, 6 several other states have adopted Leflar's choice-
189 (location of land for determining validity of a contract for the transfer of land), § 193
(principal location of the insured risk for determining validity of a fire, surety or casualty in-
surance contract).
355. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (tort), § 188 (contracts),
§ 222 (property).
356. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitu-
tional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992).
357. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Devel-
opments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465,486-87 (1992).
358. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws chap. 6,7,8.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
360. Judges may prefer the Second Restatement precisely because it is wide-ranging
and permits them the widest latitude possible. Indeed, judges seem to love it and scholars to
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influencing considerations to varying degrees. An examination of their
common law demonstrates the wide-ranging approaches that courts
employ in choice-of-law analysis.
For example, Rhode Island purports to follow Leflar's methodol-
ogy.36' But it includes in this analysis both "interest-weighing" and ap-
plication of portions of the Restatement (Second).362 Arkansas has also
adopted Leflar's analysis, at least for tort issues,3  drawing mixed re-
views.3" Hawaii uses Leflar's analysis combined with other modem ap-
proaches.365 And North Dakota relies heavily on Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations, referring to its analysis as the "significant
contacts" test, and utilizing other modem approaches as well.3"
hate it. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton et al., Conflict of Laws 132 (5th ed. 1993).
361. See Cribb v. Augustyn, 696 A.2d 285,288 (R.I. 1997).
362. Id.
363. See Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1987). But the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in attempting to apply Arkansas choice of law rules, found
that for contract cases, Arkansas followed a traditional analysis but had recently begun to
apply a "significant contacts" test. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th
Cir. 1991). See Ducharme v. Ducharme, 872 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Ark. 1994) (in a contract dis-
pute, the court applies the "most significant relationship" test, then refers to Leflar but with-
out mentioning any choice-influencing considerations). See also Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1995. A Year in Review, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 181,
199 n.105 (1996) (expressing uncertainty about Arkansas' choice-of-law methodology for
contract cases, based on an examination of several Arkansas cases using at various times a
significant contacts test, Restatement Second, lex loci contractus, and Leflar's better law ap-
proach).
364. Compare Note, Conflict of Laws-Multistate Torts-Arkansas Relies on Choice-
Influencing Considerations and the 'Better Rule of Law': Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Co., 10 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK U,. 511, 522 (1988) (the court's adoption of Leflar's
methodology "is a positive development in Arkansas law") with L. Lynn Hogue, Schlemmer
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.: A Case for Rethinking Arkansas' Choice-of-Law Rule for
Interstate Torts, 12 U. ARK. L]TrLE ROCK LJ. 459, 461, 468 (1989) (arguing that Leflar's
methodology is "bankrupt" and that the court should adopt interest analysis as its choice-of-
law analysis).
365. Beals v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 825 F. Supp. 926, 930 (D. Haw. 1993). Compare Lewis
v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988) and Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Haw. 1981)
(combined modem approach) with California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bell, 735 P.2d 499
(Haw. Ct. App. 1987) (Leflar approach). Hawaii's choice-of-law analysis has not been de-
finitively articulated. See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 363, at 202, 202 n. 129 (1996) (listing
Hawaii as a jurisdiction following a "combined modern" approach to choice of law); Patrick
J. Borchers, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1992: Observations and Reflections, 42
AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 129 n.33 (1994) (suggesting that Hawaii follows interest analysis, "but
there is clearly room for disagreement here").
366. See Plante v. Columbia Paints, 494 N.W.2d 140, 141-43 (N.D. 1992); Vigen Con-
struction Co. v. Millers Nat'l Ins. Co., 436 N.W.2d 254,256-57 (N.D. 1989); Apollo Sprinkler
Co. v. Fire Sprinkler Suppliers & Design, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 386, 389-91 (all applying the five
choice-influencing considerations but referring to its analysis as the "significant contacts"
test, with heavy reliance on the Second Restatement as well).
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Minnesota was one of the earliest states to adopt Leflar's analysis
and currently follows that analysis for both tort and contract.3 67 Like
Wisconsin courts, Minnesota courts have also had difficulty with the
analysis. One observer has noted: "The Minnesota Supreme
Court.. .has repeatedly held that only the last two factors of Professor
Leflar's test were to be considered in tort situations."3" Another has
been more blunt: "Minnesota opinions in this area have often appeared
shallow, ill-explained, and well, just not very good., 369 But that is true of
many choice-of-law analyses. When William Prosser described the
study of conflicts law as "a dismal swamp filled with quaking quagmires,
and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about
mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon,"' 0 he
could well have been describing conflicts analysis in the 1990s.
But Minnesota courts have shown on occasion that they knew how
to properly apply Leflar's methodology. In Jepson v. General Casualty
Company of Wisconsin,37' the Minnesota Supreme Court carefully and
thoughtfully applied each of the five choice-influencing considerations
to reach a sound result. The court thereby demonstrated that question-
able choice-of-law analysis cannot necessarily be attributed to the
methodology itself.
The state which best illustrates a sound, thorough application of Le-
flar's choice-influencing considerations is the state which first adopted
the methodology: New Hampshire. In Clark v. Clark,3' the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court adopted Leflar's analysis the same year in which
Leflar published his influential article, Choice Influencing Considera-
tions in Conflicts Law.373 Since that time, New Hampshire courts have
adhered to the analysis in tort cases, although adopting the Restatement
367. See Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 414 (Minn. 1973) (tort); Milbank Mut. Ins.
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Minn. 1983) (contract).
See also Symeonides, supra note 363, at 202.
368. Note, Disregarding Precedent in Minnesota Choice of Law: Nesladek v. Ford Motor
Company, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1237,1269 (1996).
369. James R. Pielemeier, Some Hope for Choice of Law in Minnesota, 18 Hamline L.
Rev. 8, 8 (1994). Critics, of course, recognize that busy judges must rely on the briefs and
arguments provided by counsel, and that assistance is often not forthcoming. See id. at 8 n.5.
"And, of course, it is the role of law professors to provide the necessary teaching to their stu-
dents to enable that assistance." Id.
370. William Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953). See also
Pielemeier, supra note 369, at 9 ("Many courts have had problems developing principled,
modern approaches to choice of law").
371. 513 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1994).
372. 222 A.2d 205,208-09 (N.H. 1966).
373. 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966).
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Second for contract 74
In Benoit v. Test Systems, Inc.'3 5 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
most recently applied Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. The
court quickly concluded that a true conflict existed because application
of one state's law would bar the plaintiff's suit, while application of an-
other state's law would allow the plaintiff to continue. 6 The court also
properly concluded that the United States Constitution would permit
application of either state's law, because both states "have significant
contacts necessary to justify the application of that State's law to this
dispute." rn Finally, the court considered each of the five choice-
influencing considerations to conclude that its own law should apply.
Just four years earlier, New Hampshire's highest court applied the same
analysis, considering all five choice-influencing considerations, and con-
cluded that nonforum law should govern. 8
Obviously, Wisconsin courts have not always successfully applied
Leflar's analysis, but that does not mean that the method should be re-
jected. It offers too many advantages over other methodologies.
In addition to its simplicity-application of five choice-influencing
considerations-the analysis can be as easily applied to contract as to
tort, thereby eliminating the initial requirement of characterization.
For example, in Diesel Service Co. v. AMBAC International Corp.,37' the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was able to bypass the contract-tort
distinction by finding that Wisconsin courts apply "similar" choice-of-
law factors to both contract and tort, even though they profess to use
different methodologies for the two issues .3But one Wisconsin judge,
in a dissenting opinion,-' found that, in a claim against an insurance
company for bad faith by failing to defend, both choice-of-law analyses-
one for tort and a different one for contract-would have to be applied."
374. See Glowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 A.2d 593,595 (N.H. 1991).
375. 694 A.2d 992 (N.H. 1997).
376. Id at 994.
377. IcL
378. See Ferren v. General Motors Corp. Delco Battery Division, 628 A.2d 265 (N.H.
1993).
379. 961 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992).
380. Id. at 639-40. "While this is not a breach of contract case, neither is it a tort case;
anyway, the factors are similar." Id. at 639 n.4.
381. See Marsh v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 42,505 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App.
1993) (Cane, PJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
382. Id at 61,505 N.W.2d at 169. But see Schlussler v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
157 Wis. 2d 516, 526-27; 460 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Ct. App. 1990) (applying the choice-
influencing considerations to "this tort cause of action to compensate for an insurer's bad
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Another advantage of Leflar's methodology is that if applied as in-
tended, it also obviates the necessity of determining whether an issue is
substantive or procedural when it has characteristics of both. Tradi-
tionally, courts have applied forum law for procedural issues and ap-
plied choice-of-law analysis only to substantive issues. But the distinc-
tion is not always clear.3 Professor Leflar himself argued that his
choice-influencing considerations could be applied to such borderline
issues: "Rules asserted to be procedural for conflicts purposes ought to
be analyzed, in their factual contexts, in terms of the relevant choice-
influencing considerations, just as rigorously as other rules of law are
analyzed in their own contexts in terms of the considerations. ' 3 4
"[I]nstead of continuing to apply relatively mechanical tests to separate
substance and procedure, which have no clear logical relationship to
choice of law concerns, ' courts might instead apply Leflar's considera-
tions to those issues as well. Employing Leflar's analysis to these issues
recognizes the complexity of choice of law decisionmaking and
its use requires a court to consider fully the implications of alter-
native outcomes before reaching a conclusion. The use of a pro-
cedural categorization, on the other hand, makes the outcome of
a case depend not on thorough analysis, but rather on a single
bipolar inquiry which must necessarily be artificial and inaccu-
rate. Further, because the effort to categorize a legal question as
substantive or procedural in the conflicts setting eludes princi-
pled analysis, the basis for the outcome must rest not on the
simple label attached to the case but rather on some unexplained
decision-making process. The absence of forthright articulation
of the real reasons for a decision makes the results in future
cases unpredictable and deprives the public of the confidence in
the process that can be achieved by full disclosure.3 6
The Second Restatement has also abandoned the bright-line distinc-
tion between substance and procedure, instead replacing it with factors
for courts to consider.3 ' And "[c]ontemporary choice of law scholars
... have uniformly advocated abandonment of the traditional sub-
faith failure to perform as promised").
383. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15. See also Marten Transport, Ltd. v. Rural
Mutual Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 738, 543 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1995) (whether a contribution
claim is mandatory or permissive is a procedural issue and Wisconsin law thus applies).
384. Leflar, supra note 85, at 240.
385. Pielemeier, supra note 369, at 33.
386. Laura Cooper, Statutes of Limitation in Minnesota Choice of Law: The Problematic
Return of the Substance-Procedure Distinction, 71 MINN. L. REV. 363, 371-72 (1986).
387. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws sec. 122 (comment b).
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stance-procedure distinction."" Applying Leflar's analysis to all issues
which may affect the outcome of a case removes the artificial distinction
between substance and procedure.
The wisest course for Wisconsin courts is to return to Leflar analy-
sis, re-learn its principles, focus on its choice-influencing considera-
tions-all of them-and eliminate references to Restatement (Second),
significant contacts, and forum preference. Furthermore, although con-
stitutional concerns may arise in choice of law decisions, the court
should refrain from employing such concerns as a means of avoiding
difficult choice of law decisions. Use of language like "officious inter-
meddling" and "interloping chauvinism," albeit colorful, add nothing to
choice-of-law analysis and serve only to obfuscate.
An abstract notion of forum preference likewise should play no role
in choice-of-law analysis. It can be accommodated easily within Leflar's
fourth choice-influencing consideration: advancement of the forum's
governmental interest. In this context, Professor Leflar recognized that
"a court has a natural and largely justifiable concern with advancement
of the governmental interests of its own state."389 But he cautions:
True governmental interests of a state are not discoverable by
blind matching with any old law that may be on the state's
books. They can be identified... only by thoughtful and intelli-
gent analysis of the legal materials in the light of current socio-
economic, cultural, and political attitudes in the community. As-
certainment of a state's governmental interests is no small task,
not one to be solved by locating a statutory section or a para-
graph in an old judicial opinion."
Leflar explains: "A governmental interest ... is discoverable by
putting together (a) the reasons supporting the rule of law in question
[the forum's or other state's law] and (b) the state's [forum's or other
state's] factual contacts with a case, or the issue in a case, to see if they
match. ," 3
91
While focusing less on forum preference, Wisconsin courts are well
advised to focus more on the interests of other states, under the
"maintenance of interstate order" consideration. This consideration
requires an understanding of the interest a state may have in any given
dispute. The court must attempt to determine the state's interest and
query whether that interest may be affected in any given case.
388. Cooper, supra note 386, at 378.
389. Leflar, supra note 44, at 290.
390. Id at 291.
391. Id.
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Wisconsin courts have demonstrated on occasion that they are ca-
pable of applying Leflar's choice-influencing considerations in a thor-
ough, principled manner. Professor Leflar himself cited Hunker v.
Royal Indemnity Co.3 2 as a good example of his analysis.393 In that 1973
case, the court clarified its analysis. A court must first determine
whether an outcome-determining conflict exists. If so, the court should
conduct a constitutional inquiry, to ensure that the court could constitu-
tionally apply the law of any of the potentially interested states.3" Then
the court should consider all five of the choice-influencing considera-
tions, including giving due "[d]eference to the interests of the [other
state's] law., 395 In Hunker, the Wisconsin court applied Ohio law.
Wisconsin should return to the careful analysis demonstrated in this
early case. Leflar's choice-influencing considerations represent an
analysis that is familiar to most courts, it can be utilized for all outcome-
determinative issues, and it would provide lower courts, federal courts,
and practicing lawyers alike with the kind of guidance required to re-
solve difficult choice-of-law questions.
392. 57 Wis. 2d 588,204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
393. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: States' Rights, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 203, 210
n.41 (1981).
394. Here, the court employed the unfortunate language of "officious intermeddling,"
rather than relying on well-settled constitutional doctrine. Hunker, 57 Wis. 2d. at 598, 204
N.W.2d at 902. See supra text accompanying notes 224-43.
395. Hunker, 57 Wis. 2d at 602,204 N.W.2d at 904.
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